Grey Areas in the Higher Education Sector: Legality versus Corruptibility by Osipian, Ararat L
Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal
Volume 2012 | Number 1 Article 6
Spring 3-1-2012
Grey Areas in the Higher Education Sector:
Legality versus Corruptibility
Ararat L. Osipian
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Higher Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Education and Law Journal by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ararat L. Osipian, Grey Areas in the Higher Education Sector: Legality versus Corruptibility, 2012 BYU Educ. & L.J. 141 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2012/iss1/6
.
GREY AREAS IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR: 
LEGALITY VERSUS CORRUPTIBILITY 
Ararat L. Osipian 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption in higher education has long been neglected as 
an area of research in the United States. Perhaps the relative 
scarcity of prosecuted cases has made such corruption appear 
to be a seemingly small problem in the nation's higher 
education system, and therefore not significant enough from a 
researcher's standpoint to warrant much attention. Because 
most cases are settled out of court, there is little case law on 
corruption in higher education. Thus, little to no precedent has 
been set, which is particularly important for a common law 
system, such as the U.S. legal system. Another explanation for 
the lack of attention might be that scholars attended higher 
education institutions (HEis), and the majority of those 
scholars are now employed by colleges and universities. The 
sense of belonging and close affiliation related to their position 
in academia may prevent scholars from conducting research on 
academic corruption. Additionally, the apparent absence of 
studies about corruption in higher education is an image 
constructed in both the scholarly community and among the 
general public because scholars do not use words denoting 
corruption. Scholars, as well as members of the media, are 
overly cautious about the language of investigations and usage 
of such explicit legal terms as "corruption," "bribery," and 
"fraud," instead choosing to replace them with such terms and 
euphemisms such as "misconduct" and "breach of integrity." 
Finally, the definition of "education corruption" is itself still 
vague and undeveloped. This vagueness creates uncertainty for 
prospective research, specifically deciding which approaches 
and methodologies to employ. The limits of the object of the 
research (i.e., the locus) also remain unclear for those who wish 
to study corruption in higher education. 
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In essence, this paper is a survey and offers general 
commentary on corruption in higher education. It defines 
corruption generally, helps to define corruption in higher 
education in the legal context, and discusses types of 
corruption in higher education by differentiating between three 
types of corruption: abuse of academic integrity, 1 corruption in 
higher education per se,2 corruption in the higher education 
sector-'. At the same time, this study looks into so-called grey 
areas, where acts that are commonly understood as corrupt are 
not immediately or explicitly qualified as illegal, and 
challenges the terms of "legality" and "corruptibility" in order 
to build a better understanding of whether all illegal acts that 
take place in higher education constitute acts of corruption. 
Additionally, this paper discusses perspectives on corruption, 
including legal, economic, social, and moral or ethical 
responsibility, analyzes records of selected legal cases devoted 
to corruption in higher education, and discusses trends and 
practices in the financial industry of educational loans. 
11. CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
A. Defining Higher Education Corruption 
The research on corruption in higher education is in its 
infancy. Few attempts have been made so far to theorize 
corruption in the education sector and to investigate it 
empirically. Corruption in academia is a global problem.4 
I. Academic integrity implies honesty in academic lift•, including scholarly 
activities. 
2. Higlwr leducation per sl: is built around the processes of teaching and !learning 
and research. 
:l. Corruption in thle higher education Sl'ctor is mon: expansiVl' than abusl' of 
academic integrity or corruption in higher education per Sle. Institutions of highl·r 
learning operate numerous other units and facilities including large nwdical centers. 
industry orilmted reslearch institutes, academic publishing, athldics, and hookst.on•s. 
From hospitals and construction and devldopment departnwnts to maintenance and 
supplies, as long as these units are formally includt•d in the universities and opl:ratl' 
under thl,ir umbrella. they an: part of thl' highl•r education sector. Therdorl'. 
corruption in the higher leducation sector includes corruption in all of tlw an:as that tlw 
institution of higlwr leducation controls. The higher education sector is also fn:quently 
refl,rn'd to as the highler education industry. 
1. For a compn,hl,nsivl' review of a varit't.y of form.s of Pducation corruption 
found in different national educational systlems. see ,)AC()LH:s HALLi\K & M Ultii·:L 
!'OlSSON, COHIWI'T SCHOOLS, COHIUJI"I' UNIVICitSITIES: WHAT CAN BE DmH:'! (20(J7). 
available at http://unpan 1.un.orglintradoc/groups/public/documents/UN ESCO/ 
UNI'AN02510:l.pdf. 
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Nevertheless, a rigorous scholarly investigation into the matter 
of academic corruption is lacking.5 Education corruption is 
detrimental for economic development and growth. The links 
between economic growth and corruption in higher education 
in Russia and in Ukraine are established and conceptualized, 6 
and the economic impact of higher education corruption on 
personal income m Central Asia has been investigated 
quantitatively. 7 In addition, others have drawn some 
inferences on corruption in universities in the Russian 
Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia, 
based on interviews. 8 However, no similar work has been done 
in the United States, and existing research relies heavily on 
people's perceptions about corruption rather than facts and 
hard evidence. The impact of human capital on economic 
growth can be diminished if educational programs are weak 
and academic degrees and credentials are bogus. 
Higher education corruption remains a definitional problem 
as well. The definition of education corruption includes abuse 
of authority for material gainY Education is an important 
public good, and thus "its professional standards include more 
than just material goods; hence the definition of education 
5. Osipian presents the first comprehensive study of forms of corruption in the 
US, the UK, and Russia, and finds that economic and structural factors are 
explanatory in researching the different forms and types of corruption across the 
nations. Ararat Osipian, Corruption in Higher Education: Does it Differ Across the 
Nations and Why(, :3 RESEAHCH TN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION 317, 
:345<l65 (2008), available at http://dx.doi.org/1 0.2:l01/rcie.2008.3.4.:l15. 
6. See AHARAT OSIPTAN, THE IMPACT OF HUMAN CAPITAL ON ECONOMIC GHOWTH: 
A CASE STUDY IN POST-SOVIET UKHAINE, 1989-2009 (2009); ARARAT 0SIPIAN, 
Education Corruption, Reform, and Growth: Case of Post-Soviet Russia, 3 JOURNAL OF 
EUHASIAN STUDIES 1 (2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ 
article/pii/S 1879:166511000248. Corruption is present in doctoral education as well, 
with dissertations offered for sale by ghostwriters. See Ararat Osipian, Le Bourgeois 
Gentilhomme: Political Corruption of Russian Doctorates, 18 DEMOKHATIZATSIYA: THE 
JOUI{NAL OF POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION 260 (2010); Ararat Osipian, Korruptsiya 
v poslediplomnom obrazovanii [Corruption in doctoral education], 8 TEHRA 
ECONOMICUS 48 (2010); Ararat Osipian, Economics of Corruption in Doctoral 
l~'ducation: The Dissertations Market, ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION REVIEW (2011), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.101 6/j.econedurev.2011.08.011. 
7. See Stephen Heyneman, Kathryn Anderson, & Nazym Nuraliyeva, The Cost of 
Corruption in Higher Education, 52 COMPARATIVI•; EDUCATION REVn;w 1, 1-26 (2008). 
8. See Georgy Petrov & Paul Temple, Corruption in Higher Education: Some 
Findings from the States of the Former Soviet Union. 16 HIGHER EDUCATION 
MANAGEMENT ANn POLICY 99 (2001); Stephen Heyneman, Three Universities in 
Georuia, Kazahhstan and Kyruyzstan: The Struuule Against Corruption and for Social 
Cohesion, 37 PHOSPECTS: QUARTERLY REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE EDUCATION 305 (2007). 
9. FRANK ANECHIAJUCO & JAMES JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: 
HOW COIWUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE 5 (1995). 
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corruption includes the abuse of authority for personal as well 
as material gain." 10 The relativity of the term corruption has 
been applied to academia: 
The notion of a corrupt official or other role occupant exists 
only relative to some notion of what an uncorrupted occupant 
of that morally legitimate role consists of. The notion of an 
academic has at its core the moral ideal, or at least, the 
morally legitimate role, of an independent truth-seeker who 
works in accordance with accepted principles of reason and 
evidence, who publishes in his or her own name only work 
that he or she has actually done, and so on. So an academic 
motivated by a desire for academic status who intentionally 
falsifies his or her experimental results or plagiarizes the 
work of others is corrupt relative to the ideal or morally 
legitimate role of an uncorrupted academic. On the other 
hand, a person occupying an academic position who paid no 
heed whatsoever to the truth or to principles of reasoning and 
evidence and who made no pretense of so doing would at some 
point cease to be an academic of any sort, corrupt or 
otherwise. 11 
The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) 
defines corruption in education as a "misuse of public office for 
private gain that influences access, quality, and equity in 
education." 12 Some present a broad social approach to define 
corruption, 13 while others adhere to the legal approach to 
corruption and apply a narrow definition that regards 
corruption as such only if it implies illegality. 14 National laws 
differ, and legality and illegality are not universal. Accordingly, 
there might be not one universal definition of corruption in 
higher education that would apply equally well to different 
national systems in different historical periods. Granting 
access to publicly funded higher education on any premise 
10. Stephen Heyneman, /~ducat ion and Corruption, 21 IN'I'I-:IlNATIOI\:\L .)OUI(I\,\L 
OF EllLJ('.A'I'IO:-.Ii\L DEVELOPMENT ();)7, 6:38 (20(H). 
11. Seumas Milll'r, Pc•ter Roburts & Edward Spence, COIWUPTIOI\ ANIJ i\1\TI-
COHIWl'TIO:-.J; AI\ i\I'I'L'":Ll PHILOSOPHICAL APPIWACH 5 (2005). 
12. Moriel Poisson, Corruption and l~dumtion. UNESCO I NTI•:IlNATIO:-.Ii\L 
1:-.JSTITUTE FOil EDUCATIONAL l'Li\:-.1:-.JI:'·H: (2007). available at 
http://www. iil'p. unesco.org/fileadmin/user upload/ I nfo_Services l'ublications/pdf/20 I 0/ 
EdPol_ll. pdf. 
1 il. Taleh Sayed & David Bruce. !'alice Corruption: 'J(Jwards a Worliinf[ 
JJefinition, 7 AI•'I\ICAN SECLIIUTY REVI~:w 1, 1 (1998): Duncan Waite & David Alletl. 
Corruption and Abuse of !'ower in l~ducational Administ.ration, :35TH 1•: UHB.'\N I{EVI EW 
281, 281 (200:3). 
1·1. l'drov, Corrupfl:on in Higher l~ducation, at 100. 
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other than academic merit is equated to corruption, as is access 
to higher education in exchange for a bribe. In the 
decentralized market-based systems of higher education, 
gammg access to educational services in exchange for 
payments is a norm. Depending on the system and legal 
frameworks laid in the society, certain forms of funding, modes 
of operation, patterns of behavior, and standards of conduct in 
higher education may be considered corrupt or non-corrupt. 
Corruption in higher education is time and place specific, and 
may be found in public and private colleges. 
The solutions that states offer in order to curb corruption 
are superficial and partial at best, leaving plenty of space for 
corrupt educators to act. Education vouchers, standardized 
tests, student loans, and partial privatization of higher 
education are among the reforms aimed at tackling corruption 
in the higher education sector. 15 The success of the reforms has 
yet to be seen. Corruption in higher education becomes 
institutionalized and develops its own internal hierarchies, 
resistant to change, 16 and institutional rigidity helps 
corruption hierarchies in higher education in developing and 
transition societies. 17 As used in economics, the definition of 
corruption underlines the role of the state and assumes 
corruptibility of a government official. However, corruption in 
higher education presents the need for a more inclusive 
definition. 
The challenge to the understanding of corruption as applied 
to higher education arises when confronted with cases of 
15. See Ararat Osipian, Replacing University Entry Examinations with 
Standardized Tests in Russia: Will It Reduce Corruption~. UCEA CONFERENCE 
PROCEEDINGS FOR CONVENTION 2007 (D. Thompson and F. Crampton editors 2007), 
auailable at http://www.ucea.org/storage/convention/convention2007/proceedings/ 
Osipian2_UCEA2007.pdf; Ararat Osipian, Higher l~ducation Corruption in Ukraine: 
Opinions and /<;stimates, 49 INTERNATIONAL HIGHEI{ EDUCATION 21, 21-22 (2007); 
Ararat Osipian, Vouchers, Tests, Loans, Privatization: Will They Help Tackle 
Corruption in Russian Higher l~ducation?, :39 PROSPECTS: QUARTERLY I{EVIEW OF 
COMI'AnATIVE EDUCATION 47, 47-67 (2009); Ararat Osipian, Corruption and Reform in 
Hi{{her Education in Uhraine, :38 CANADIAN AND INTimNATIONAL EDUCATION .JOUI<NAL 
101, 101-122 (2009). 
16. Ararat Osipian, Corruption Hierarchies in Higher 8ducation in the Former 
Soviet Bloc, 29 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT :321, :321-:3:30 
(2009) 
17. Ararat Osipian, Corruption Hierarchies in J<;ducation in Developing and 
Transition Societies, UCEA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS FOR CONVENTION (D. 
Thompson and F. Crampton editors 2007), available at http://www.ucca.org/ 
storage/con vcn tion/convcn tion2007 /proccedings/Osi pian 1_ U C EA2007. pdf. 
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bribery, which can take place in private HEis as well as public 
HEls. 1 x The fact that students pay bribes in exchange for good 
grades independently of the type of HEI urges for more 
inclusiveness in the definition of corruption. This paper applies 
the definition of "corruption in higher education as a system of 
informal relations established to regulate unsanctioned access 
to material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office 
of public or corporate trust." 19 
Educators often have incentives to become involved in 
corrupt activities not due to their natural corruptness or low 
ethical standards, but due to low salaries. University 
professors commit corrupt acts in exchange for illicit benefits in 
order to supplement their income. Indeed, the "feed from the 
service" way of living in academia can be found throughout the 
education sector.20 The opportunistic behavior of professors 
leads them into conflict of interest and collusion with 
businesses and political groups. 21 Political graft and education 
corruption often go hand in hand. This form of collusion 
perpetuates illicit activities in academia and anticipates 
benefits for politicians extracted not in monetary form, but in 
form of academic distinctions, loyalty, compliance, and control. 
Universities award doctoral degrees to politicians as a sign of 
respect, often in exchange for patronage, lobbying, and 
financial support. 22 In fact, the ruling regimes may be 
interested in corrupt universities for it makes it easier to coerce 
educators into compliance with the state orders if these 
Hl. A1wcdotal l'videncp from thu Former Sovid Bloc indicates that hriiH'ry· in 
higlwr t;ducation may be as common in private collcgt•s as in stat(• col!t•ges and 
universities. See Ararat Osipian, looyalty as /lent: Corruption and I'oliticization of 
llussian Uniuersitics, :l2 lNTEllNi\TIONi\L JOlJilNi\1. <H' SOCIOI.O<:Y i\NIJ SOCIAl. I'OI.ICY 
(20 12) (forthcoming). 
19. Ararat Osipian. Corruption in Higher l~ducation: Conceptual Appmaches and 
Measurement Techniques, 2 l{i•:SEi\llCH IN COMI'i\IL\'I'IVE AND lNTJo:llNXI'ION,\1. 
EDUCATION :lill, :315 (2007). 
20. Ararnt Osipian, "Feed from the Seruice':- Corruption and Coercion in the 
State-Uniuasity !?elations in Central l~urusia, 1 !{fo:SI•:AilCH IN Co~II'Ail.\TIVE ,\:-.JJJ 
lNTI.;IlNi\TIONAL EllUCi\TI0:-..1 182 (2009). 
21. The impact of husim>sses on the academia is addrt>ssl'd in ,J fo:NNI Flm 
WASHBUilN. TIH: COili'Oili\TE COIUWI''J'ION OF AMJo:IW'i\:-.1 HH:111m EJJLH'.\TI0:-..1 (2005). 
Tlw issue of existing links between the state and univnsities in the fornwr Sovil>l. 
republics is addressed in Ararat Osipian, l'olitical Graft and l~ducation Corruption in 
Ulm1ine: Compliance, Collusion, and Control, 1 () DI,:MoKIL\Tii:A'I'SIYA: TH 1·: ,JOlJil:-.1.\L OF 
!'OST-Sovn:T DEMOCRATIZATION :J2:l (2008). 
22. See Ararat Osipian, Le Bourgeois Oentilhomme: l'olitical Corruption of 
Hussiun /Joctorates. 18 DEMOKili\Tii:ATSIYi\: 'I'H E ,JOLJilC'JAL OF !'o:-;T-SOVI ET 
lh:MOCIL\Tii:i\TION 260 (2010). 
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educators are involved in corruption.23 
In Russia, where the judiciary branch is relatively weak, 
the media pays most attention to bribes paid in exchange for 
admissions to publicly funded places in HEis and bribery in the 
academic process, because these are the most obvious and 
explicit forms of corruption. Bribes are presumed to have a 
monetary form, which is traditionally least acceptable and not 
well tolerated by the society. Conversely, nepotism and 
cronyism are often overlooked, while these forms of corruption 
might have more presence in higher education and more 
impact on the admissions policy than bribes. Forms of 
corruption in higher education in the United States emphasize 
state-university relations. Fraud is often the product of grey 
areas in legislation. At the same time, issues of fraud are 
relatively easy to move to court, because the state interests are 
at stake. Therefore, many issues are traditionally decided 
through the judiciary branch of the government. 
B. Corruption as a Grey Area 
A grey area is a term used to describe terms that are 
unclearly defined, or a border that is hard or even impossible to 
define, or where a dividing line tends to shift. A grey area 
signifies a problem of sorting reality into clearly cut categories. 
In legal terms, a grey area is an area where no clear legislation 
or precedent exists, where it is not clear whether the existing 
rules are applicable to specific cases and to what extent. A grey 
area of legislation, as applied to particular industries, sectors, 
market segments, or areas of social life, signifies an ethical 
dilemma where the border between corrupt and non-corrupt 
activities is vague. 
The term "grey area" has been used in addressing the 
economics of corruption.24 Although economics have advanced 
significantly in modeling corruption, it experiences difficulties 
in testing the models due to the lack of large and reliable 
2:3. The issue of university autonomy versus state control is theorized in Ararat 
Osipian, Corruption and Coercion: University Autonomy versus State Control, 40 
EUJUJPEAN EDUCATION: ISSUES AND STUDIES 27 (200R); Ararat Osipian, Cormpt£on in 
the Politicized University: Lessons for Ukraine's 2010 Presidential l~lections, 2::3 
INNOVATION: THE EUIWI'EAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 101 (2010). 
24. See Andrei Shleifer & l{ohert Vishny, Corruption, 108 QUART~~RLY JOUI{NAL 
OF ECONOMICS 599 (199:1). 
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datasets. 25 Whatever problem economists might have m 
explaining corruption is indicated by the definition of 
corruption as an "allocative mechanism" for scarce resources. 26 
The state monopolizes certain allocative functions, be it 
permissions and licenses, or access to public services. State 
officials' profiteering is based on abuse of their discretionary 
powers and monopolistic positions. Some scholars propose a 
"new ... explicitly micro-founded definition of corruption": 
[Corruption] is viewed as a collusive agreement between a 
part of the agents of the economy who, as a consequence. are 
able to swap (over time; we present a repeated game) in terms 
of positions of power (i.e. are able to capture, together, the 
allocation process of the economy). This is the idea underlying 
high-level corruption or "influence", and is broader than the 
notion of bribery, which corresponds to a particular sharing 
pattern of the joint payoff from the referred relationship. 27 
The challenge to the domain of bribery in the issues of 
corruption, however, does not eliminate grey areas that exist in 
both legislation and scholarly work. Grey areas in legal 
scholarship and in economics reflect on legislation and the 
national economy, respectively, and overlap. Tax evasion and 
fraud as key characteristics of shadow or unofficial economy 
are good examples of such an overlap. At least two scholars, 
Georgy Petrov and Paul Temple, have critiqued the grey area 
notion: 
[W]e find unconvincing the proposition that there exists a 
continuum from "honest" to "corrupt" behaviour. Such a 
continuum implies a "grey area". The example given at a 
recent conference on corruption in education of such a "grey 
area" was the practice of some US universities of giving the 
children of alumni preference in admission procedures 
(Hallak and Poisson, 2002). This example simply adds to our 
doubts about the "continuum" notion: one may judge this to be 
an undesirable way of managing university admissions, but a 
stated institutional policy, presumably adopted with the 
25. See, for instance, SUSAN ROSI·>ACKEIUvL\;\1, COIWLJI''I'I0;\1: A STUDY l;\1 
1\JLITICi\L ECONOMY (197H): .Jean Tirole, Collusion and the Theory of Organizations. in 
AllVi\NCI<:S IN I':Co;\IOMIC THEOI\Y (1992); l'ranab Bardhan. Corruption and 
IJcuelopment: A Hcuiew of Issues. :l5 .)OLJHNAL OF ECONOMIC LITEI\i\'I'LIIil': 1 :l20 (1997). 
26. Hosc-Aclierman, at 2. 
27. Danic>l Kaufmann & Pedro Vicente, Legal Corruption, 1 SOCL\L SCII•:NCE 
RI•:SI·:AilCH NETWORK :l (2005), cwailahle at h ttp://papcrs.ssrn .com/so I :ll 
papers.cfm?ahst.ract id=H29H•11. 
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intention of in some sense benefiting the institution as a 
whole, cannot, we suggest, sensibly be classified as corrupt. 2f\ 
149 
Clearly, Petrov and Temple are against the notion of grey 
area. They consider the notion of "honest" as the opposite to 
"corrupt" and accept these two as the only existing conditions.29 
This paper agrees with the notion of legality and illegality as 
applied to the problem of corruption, yet considers it necessary 
to accept the fact that not all types of corrupt activities or 
forms of corruption are embedded in the national legislations. 
Furthermore, the legal lens is perfectly applicable to corruption 
in education, but not sufficient to understand and reflect on the 
complexity of the issue. The broad scope of the problem 
explains the vagueness of its borders. 
Ill. TYPES OF CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Corruption in higher education is an emerging subfield in 
the loosely-defined scholarly field of education policy. United 
States-based scholars have produced few works on the issue of 
higher education corruption. But while rigorous systematic 
scholarly research of this issue is lacking, the media has been 
more generous in its coverage of specific cases of higher 
education corruption. The news media frequently reports on 
"blatantly wrongful conduct" in the world of academia. 30 What 
exactly is this blatantly wrongful conduct that may be found in 
American colleges and universities? 
Higher education corruption should be separated into three 
categories: corruption of academic integrity, corruption in 
higher education per se, and corruption in the higher education 
sector. Academic integrity includes misconduct in academic 
activities, such as research fraud, cheating, and plagiarism. 
Corruption in higher education is more inclusive than academic 
integrity; it involves bribery. Bribery is encompassed in the 
realm of corruption in higher education per se (and not in 
academic integrity) because bribery is an explicit expression of 
financial incentives; it can have impact on judgment of 
academics performing certain administrative functions, but it 
does not carry the academic load. Finally, corruption in the 
28. l'etrov & Temple, Corruption in Higher gducation, at 85. 
29. ld. 
:30. Vincent .Johnson, Corruption in Education: A Global Legal Challenge, 48 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1 7 (2008). 
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higher education sector includes all forms of corruption related 
to higher education-not just as an academic activity, hut as a 
functioning industry. Where corruption of academic integrity is 
on one end of the spectrum, limited to corruption dealing with 
actual academia, corruption in the higher education sector 
would he on the opposite end of the spectrum, dealing with 
corruption beyond just academia. For instance, professional 
misconduct in university hospitals, which does not qualify as 
corruption in academic industry, is qualified as corruption in 
the higher education sector, simply because a university 
hospital constitutes a part of the HEI. The university hospital 
example emphasizes the fact that professional misconduct in a 
university hospital is corruption in the higher education sector 
by virtue of it being a "university hospital." At the same time, 
this same case is not an example of corruption in academic 
integrity because it docs not have anything to do with actual 
"academics." 
There is a clear trend in the U.S. that gives more attention 
to fraud and plagiarism than bribery. 31 Media attention reflects 
growing concern about corruption in academia. More attention 
is now paid to fraud and plagiarism, rather than possible 
bribery in admissions. These findings help to determine which 
aspects of corruption in higher education should he given more 
consideration in future research and which might be 
prioritized, as well as how the national systems of higher 
education can be improved. 32 Specifics of the U.S. higher 
education industry explain the uniqueness of the types of 
corruption to the U.S. In particular, "The growing market of 
private educational loans in the US, which has increased 
tenfold over the last decade, rising from $1.57 billion to $17 
billion, leads to different types of fraud in state-university 
relations. Fraudulent activities, in their turn, necessitate state 
and federal investigations."33 Many different types of fraud 
that infiltrate the three areas of corruption in higher education 
arc discussed below. 
:n. Tlwrl' an' also differences in t.hl' types of corruption bdwl't'n tlw Unitt-d 
Statl's. Llw Unit(•d Kingdom. and Llw Russian Fedl'ration. Sonw forms of corruption m·e 
n•gion-specific. whill' others nrc univ(,rsal; t.nws of corruption nn• comwcted to thl' 
charactl'ristics of thl' national systl'ms. 
:12. Ararat Osipian. Corruption in Higher l~ducalion: /Joes it /Jijj(T Across the 
Nations and Why(,;; n~<:s. It\ COI\11'. ,\Nil 1:--.JT'L EJJLIC. :H5 (2008). 
:l:l. /d. nt. :lfi1. 
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A. Financial Misconduct 
One form of higher education corruption is financial 
misconduct, which includes HEI's financial officers 
participating in financial activities that hurt students and 
impair the quality of their education. Embezzlement, fraud, 
and frivolous classes are forms of corruption in the U.S. higher 
education sector.34 "Other corrupt practices in American higher 
education include no-show jobs that deplete university budgets, 
over-billing of the government, prohibited payments to 
athletes, obstruction of justice, overpayments as a result of no-
bid contracts, improper gifts, kickbacks related to student 
loans, and, occasionally, even bribery of college or university 
officials."35 In one instance, the directors of financial aid at 
three major universities "held shares in a student loan 
company that each of the universities recommends to student 
borrowers, and in at least two cases profited handsomely."36 
Presumably, students were the victims of such illicit 
arrangements. A grey area in legal terms is an area where no 
clear legislation or precedent exists. 37 It is also not clear 
whether the existing rules are applicable to specific cases and 
to what Pxtent. Application of laws in certain market segments 
does not guarantee that they will have a similar or identical 
application in the higher education sector. A law may be 
applied successfully to incidences of corruption in the public 
sector, but have no court precedent in similar practices in the 
higher education sector. As such, application of laws in 
unchartered waters of private educational loans and other 
areas of possible misconduct in the higher education sector de 
facto faces initial difficulties raised by the existing grey areas. 
B. Faculty Wrongdoing 
It seems students are being portrayed as victims, not only 
in regard to unfair dealings of university administrators with 
:H. Johnson , supra note :lO, at :n. 
:l5. !d. at 17 ·18. 
:16. ,Jonathan D. Glater, Student Loans Led to Benefits by Collq;e Aides, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at Al. 
:n. Osipian describes grey areas in the higher education sector finance through 
the prism of legality and corruption. See Ararat Osipian, Grey Areas in the Higher 
8ducation Sector Finance: llle{fality versus Corruption (Mar. 21, 2009) (unpublished 
paper, presented at the Annual Meeting of the American };ducation Finance 
Association (AEFA)). 
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student loan providers, but also in regard to academic abuse 
from university faculty. For instance, one scholar suggests that 
modern academic practices in some U.S. colleges and 
universities arc deceptive, to a certain extent, and work to 
disorient students. He makes a strong statement by suggesting 
that professors and college administrators arc cheating 
students of their future. He point to professors having 
abandoned the lecture hall and their teaching responsibilities, 
instead turning over much of their teaching load to unqualified 
and busy graduate students, and how academic standards in 
both grading and research have declined to even lower levels: 
They are the corrupt priests of America's colleges and 
universities and, while small in number, their influence is 
large and pervasive. They are the great pretenders of 
academe. They pretend to teach, they pretend to do original, 
important work. They do neither. They are impostors in the 
temple. And from these impostors, most of the educational ills 
of America flow. Only when we understand these renegade 
intellectual priests. and take action against them, can 
America's full intellectual integrity and power be restored. 1x 
Another scholar also holds a negative view on college 
professors' behavior. Pointing to overcrowded classrooms, 
teaching duties delegated to graduate assistants, and easy to 
pass courses specifically designed for underperforming tuition-
paying students, he notes that professors are most concerned 
with the publish or perish race and position themselves as 
experts with the help of sophisticated professional language: 
"Whatever lofty claims they might make about their ideals ... 
academics share the same motives that animate the souls of 
every bureaucracy and closed guild ... Every petty bureaucrat 
recognizes that power rests, in large part, on the ability to 
cloak his or her knowledge behind a veil of inf1ated and 
intimidating jargon," which the author also calls "profspeak."39 
While the major perpetrators in student loan schemes appear 
to be college administrators colluding with private, for-profit 
student loan providers existing outside the academia world, the 
academic perpetrators exist within the academia world. 
:11:1. 1\1.\I{TIN i\NIH:m;oN. ]'\11'0STOilS IN TilE 'l'I•:MI'LI<:: i\i'vli.:IIIC.\N ]NTELLI·:("I'U.\LS 
AilE DESTIWYIN<: Ollll UNIVI-:IISITII·:s ANil CHI•:ATIN<: OUI! STlJilENTS OF 'l'HEIH FUTlllll·: 
10 omJ2). 
:19. CHAHLI•:s .J. SYK~:s. l'll<WSCA:\1: l'IWFESSOilS ANil THI·: [)!.:~liSE <W HI<:IIEH 
EllLICATION 109 (1988). 
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C. Academic Fraud 
Another form of higher education corruption is academic 
fraud. In their book Fraud and Education: The Worm in the 
Apple, authors Harold Noah and Max Eckstein say that, "The 
major incentive to cheat in school, college, university, and the 
professions, to plagiarize, fabricate research, and offer false 
credentials, derives from the intense competitive pressures 
that have built up everywhere in contemporary societies and 
their institutions."40 They then continue: "Universities compete 
vigorously for federal government research contracts, and 
among researchers themselves the quest for grant money is a 
major preoccupation."41 The issues of cheating and plagiarism, 
thought to be widespread among students, also exist among 
faculty. Arguably the most serious and widespread forms of 
corruption in academia, cheating and plagiarism are thought to 
corrupt the purpose and mission of higher education, but they 
are not easily regarded as corruption in the legal sense. While 
student loan fraud schemes have identifiable monetary 
incentives, quantifiable in dollars and cents, cheating and 
plagiarism erode the core of academia, resulting in exponential 
social costs. 
D. Misconduct in University-Industry Relations 
Most scholars of corruption in higher education focus not on 
financial misconduct, faculty wrongdoing, and academic fraud, 
but instead concentrate on misconduct in university-industry 
relations. Indeed, the academic integrity of university 
researchers appears to be at stake every time corporate 
interests are involved. This notion and practice of misconduct 
in university-industry relations may relate to research, 
scholarship, or even legal scholarship, when it comes to giving 
expert testimonies on particular issues of importance to 
corporations, the state, and the general public. 
Scholarly misconduct in the sciences, as well as the complex 
relations between academia and industry, comes in many 
forms: 
The list [of intersections between industry and academia] 
10. HAROLD NOAH & MAX ECKSTEIN, FRAUD AND EDUCATION: THE WORM !01 THE 
i\PPLJ' lcl6-l cl7 (2(J(Jl). 
11. !d. 
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includes. for example, contractual arrangements between a 
corporation and a university, technology transfer, strategic 
research alliances, and spinoff companies. Despite the 
literature's broader conceptualization of academic capitalism, 
its primary reference point remains the exchange of funding 
and research between a corporation and a university, or 
variations on this exchange.42 
The methodology of investigating corruption in American 
higher education also falls in the realm of possible abuses of 
academic integrity where research may be influenced by 
funding from outside corporations.43 In studying how corporate 
influence corrupts higher education, one author points out the 
dangers that arise: 
Corporate funding of universities is growing and the money 
comes with strings attached. In return for this funding, 
universities and professors arc acting more and more like for-
profit patent factories: university funds arc shifting from the 
humanities and the less profitable science departments into 
research labs, and the skill of teaching is valued less and less. 
Slowly hut surely, universities are abandoning their 
traditional role as disinterested sources of education. 
alternative perspectives, and wisdom. This growing influence 
of corporations over universities affects more than just today's 
college students (and their parents); it compromises the 
future of all those whose careers depend on a university 
education, and all those who will he employed, governed, or 
taught by the products of American universities. 44 
The funding effect is directly related to the conflict of 
interest that emerges every time the research is funded by an 
outside for-profit entity. Moreover, the conflict of interest and 
the possible bias in reporting research results is not confined to 
relations between universities and for-profit entities; it can also 
be found in the relationships between universities and the 
states. 
An example of such a complex conflict of interest is 
1~. Melissa Amh:rson. The Complex llclutions between the Academy and Industry: 
Vieli's from the Literature. 72 ,J. 01-' HI<:HJ•:n EllLIC. ~~(), ~,11 (~001): see also Ml·:uss.\ 
,\l\Jli.:J{S0:-.1, Uncouering thl' Couert: Hesearch on Academic Misconduct, in 
1'1·:1\SPI·:CTIVI•:S ON SCHOLAI\LY MISCONIJLJ(''J' 1'\ Till·: SCIENCES (,John Braxton ed., HI~~). 
·l:l. See Ararat Osipinn, fntwstiguting Corntption in American Higher l~ducation: 
The Methodology, •1 TilE FEJJUNI ,JOUI\Ni\1. OF H lf:tilm ElllH'XI'ION ·19 (~000). 
11. JENNIFEI\ W.\SII BUilN, THE COili'OIL\TE COI\IWPTION OJ! AMEIOC,\N HI< :H El\ 
EllLICi\'1'101'\ 1 (2005). 
lJ LEGALITY VERSUS CORRUPTIBILITY 155 
research on the negative effects of smoking, where researchers, 
universities, the tobacco industry, the government, healthcare 
service providers, and the general public are involved. It may 
well be the case that research universities tailor their findings 
if their research is funded by the government, healthcare 
industry, or pharmaceutical companies, and in a way that 
allows them to cater to their sponsors' needs and expectations. 
For instance, if a team of researchers have results of a 
preliminary study showing that tobacco smoking causes 
reduction in the level of obesity among youth, then they are not 
likely to receive governmental funding for their major research 
project, because the government does not want to encourage 
smoking in order to fight the epidemics of obesity. At the same 
time, tobacco companies may become interested and eager to 
fund this kind of research, where certain results, favoring the 
industry's product, are expected by the company management. 
The conflict of interest rises not because researchers accept 
funding from external agencies, but because they have 
incentives to alter the design of the research plan and/or 
misreport or underreport the results, while trying to please 
their sponsors and secure future grants. At the same time, 
external sponsors are de facto interested parties, expecting 
certain results from the researchers as a return on their 
investment, made in the form of grants. The results of the 
research affect the sponsors, and this effect may be both 
positive and negative. 
Expert credibility and academic honesty are important 
when it comes to testimonies on cases which involve large 
companies and significant financial resources. Some scholars, 
in addressing the issue of wrongdoing in assessing empirical 
research where interests of major corporations are at stake, 
have concluded that "[r]eliability, validity, and transparency .. 
. are the most prominent standards empirical researchers use 
to assess the integrity of research. Clearly the legal academy 
has some work to do to better signal its commitment to them. 
But just as clearly these standards-not the Court's 
approach-are the best available criteria to detect bias in 
research."45 Another scholar, studying the Exxon Shipping Co. 
v. Baker case in the context of academic integrity,46 analyzed 
15. Lee Epstein & Charles Clarke, Academic Integrity and Legal Scholarship in 
the Wahe of l~xxon Shipping, 21 STAN. L. & l'OL'Y REV. :3:3, 50 (2010). 
16. 12S. S. Ct. 2605, 2626 (200S). 
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the integrity of sponsored law and economics research used in 
lawsuits that involve significant potential punitive damages, 
and made the following remarks: 
If the academic enterprise is ultimately a quest for truth and 
understanding, it should not he receptive to attempts by 
outsiders to steer the direction of that quest to their 
ideological or economic advantage. The Exxon-funded 
punitive damages research is therefore troubling from the 
perspective of the integrity of the law and economics 
discipline. Had the academic journals and the university 
presses that published the research been aware of both the 
provenance and the narrow pecuniary purpose of its sponsor, 
they arguably should have declined to publish it out of respect 
for the integrity of the discipline, just as ,Justice Souter 
declined to rely on it out of respect for the integrity of the 
appellate proceeding. Similarly, as members of the academic 
discipline, the scholars who conducted and published the 
research should have, out of respect for the integrity of the 
discipline, declined to accept Exxon's support at the outset. 4 7 
The not-so-hypothetical question of who the researchers 
really are~independent scholars or hired guns~comes to mind 
every time significant awards are involved in court disputes. In 
researching and commenting on this type of corruption, 
authors use such terminology as "sponsor-controlled research," 
"secret sponsorship," "independence," "disclosure," "appearance 
of control," "integrity of the discipline," and so on, all of which 
point to the presence of the strong influence of corporations on 
research and researchers. 
Another author has studied transparency, objectivity, 
disclosure, conflict of interest (and potential conflict of 
interest), and professional ethics in sponsored research. 
Focusing on physician disclosure of gifts and honoraria, the 
author identifies "four ethical grounds for managing or 
proscribing conflicts of interest among university faculty": 
They can be characterized by the terms stewardship, 
transparency, consequentialism, and integrity of science. 
Stewardship pertains to the responsibility for the proper 
management of public funds and resources used in carrying 
out research. Transparency requires that the methods, 
sources of materials, background literature, contributions of 
17. Thomas McGarity. A Moucment, a /,uwsuit, and the lnte.~·rity of Sponsored 
Luw and /~('()nomics Ueseurch. 21 STAN. L. & l'oL'Y l{EV. 51, 77 (2010). 
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authors to the research project, and limitations to the study 
are made available to the reviewers, journal editors, and 
readers. Consequentialism refers to the link between a 
behavior (such as a COl) and the quality of the research 
outcome (such as bias). Finally, integrity of science speaks to 
the public confidence in the scientific enterprise, which could 
be compromised despite complete transparency and an 
outcome of objective scicnce.4x 
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Two other scholars argue that corporate manipulation of 
research is based on similar strategies across five industries: 
tobacco, pharmaceutical, lead, vinyl chloride, and silicosis-
generating industries (mining, foundries, and sandblasting).49 
They argue that, "ultimately, conflicts of interest need to be 
eliminated, not just managed."50 
E. Diploma Mills and Degree Fraud 
There has been some debate about whether the presence of 
diploma and degree mills should be considered an area of study 
of corruption in higher education. On one hand, the issue of 
diploma mills and degree mills is directly related to the higher 
education sector and is also considered as a part of corruption. 
On the other hand, it has little to do with the core function of 
academia, and thus may oftentimes be omitted from research 
on corruption in higher education. The diploma mills industry 
is somewhat similar to the illegal industry of fake IDs; it 
specializes in production of fake educational certificates, 
diplomas, transcripts, and other documents that certify 
educational credentials of their holder. Diploma mills are 
private on-line operated entities that issue their own worthless 
degrees or produce fake educational documents that replicate 
those issued by accredited colleges and universities. The 
problem of diploma mills must be solved by legislation, largely 
because "state lawsuits against diploma mills have often been 
ineffective, doing little more than causing a diploma mill to 
relocate to a different jurisdiction from which it continues to 
1H. Sheldon Krimsky, Combating the Funding l~ffect in Science: What"s Beyond 
Transparency~, 21 STAN. L. & I'OL'Y REV. 81, 84 (2010). 
19. ,Jenny White & Lisa Hero, Corporate Manipulation of Research: Strategies Are 
Similar Across Fiue Industries, 21 STAN. L. & I'OL'Y REV. 105, 106 (2010). 
50. /d. at 1 ::l:l. For a review of major forms of academic fraud that exist in the 
modern higher education sector, including its social causes and institutional responses, 
see Richard Epstein, Academic Fraud Today: Its Social Causes and Institutional 
Responses, 21 STAN. L. & i'OL'Y REV. 1::35 (2010). 
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sell its product unimpeded."51 
IV. LEGALITY VEHSUS C(mHUPTTnTLlTY 
A. Perspectives on Corruption: Legal, Economic, Social, and 
Moral/ Ethical Responsibility 
Not all illegal acts that take place in higher education 
constitute acts of corruption. At the same time, not all acts that 
are commonly understood as corrupt are immediately or 
explicitly qualified as illegal. Broader conceptual 
understanding of corruption is needed. Legality and 
corruptibility may be dominating characteristics of a corrupt 
agreement. Corruptibility denotes possibilities for abuse and 
vulnerability of the system overall, while legality implies 
certain laws set by the public through the state or the ruling 
regime. The issue of legality versus corruptibility is appealing 
in the sense that it pos1t10ns intents, possibilities, 
opportunities, mere expectations, and public trust against such 
specific terms as public office, size of a bribe, fact of bribery, 
etc. It allows for more space for a productive discussion, not 
limited by the strictly legal terminology and not bound within 
the limits oflegal rationality. 
In his article Conceptualising the Context and 
Contextualising the Concept: Corruption Reconsidered, David 
Arora singles out four perspectives on corruption, including 
legal, historico-cultural, public interest, and market-centered 
approaches. 52 The four perspectives offer a broader scope for 
understanding responsibility than does a standard legal frame. 
"According to Arora, the main advantage of adopting a legal 
perspective on corruption is that it 'enables an agreement over 
the definition and ... scope of its study.' It therefore involves 
defining corruption in terms of behavior which deviates from 
the legal norms of public office."53 Another author presents a 
review of conceptual approaches to the issue of corruption. 
outlines primary and secondary corruption, and points to the 
:") 1. Gt·orgt• Collin. Emily Lawn• net' & /\Ian Contn•1·as. Complexities in IA•gislatil'<' 
Suppression oliJiploma Mills. :21 STAN. L. & PoJ,'y J{J.;y_ 1.:2 (:2010). 
fi2. David Arora. Conceptualising the Context and Contextuulising the ( 'onccpt: 
Corruption lleconsidered, :l9 IN!l!AN.J. OF I'll!:. 1\DMIN. 1 (199:l). 
i'i:l. l'd('r Hodgkinson. The Sociology o/ Corruption: Some ThciiH'S and Issues. :n 
Soc. 17, 11-1 (1997). 
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weaknesses and possible pitfalls of marketization m public 
services. He suggests that: 
[t]he attempt to model public service organizations on private 
enterprise is meant to align the former with a changed socio-
economic environment. The basic premise being that the 
success of the private sector model can be replicated in the 
public services. Marketisation has therefore involved a 
movement from "budgetary" to "for-profit" organizations. 54 
In addition to legal perspective, there might be numerous 
other perspectives employed, including historic, cultural, public 
interest, and market-centered perspectives. Another approach 
anticipates possible conceptual frames based on legal, 
economic, social, moral, and ethical responsibilities. The 
multiplicity of approaches makes it possible to fully appreciate 
the complexity of legal issues that emerge and develop in the 
higher education sector in the context of economic, social, and 
political processes. 
Economic processes and determinants are the most 
influential in any segment of social life, including the higher 
education sector. The economic responsibility appears to be 
fundamental for modern HEis. As applied to higher education, 
a legal lens uses the existing laws and regulations that 
highlight complex processes occurring in the education sector 
in order to sort out legal and illegal ones. It appears to be a 
simple task, at least in theory, but when it comes to the 
application of laws and legal precedents to specific 
circumstances in the higher education sector, the legal frame 
becomes insufficient. It prevents from fully understanding the 
underlying structure of incentives that make agents commit 
certain crimes and the economic and financial context in which 
these crimes are committed. The economic responsibility 
anticipates compliance with mutually accepted economic 
obligations under which violations of such obligations are 
considered a breach of contract. Reduced class time, increased 
class size, absence of office hours held by faculty members, and 
unfavorable lending terms and conditions on educational loans 
may be considered a breach of contract. While not necessarily 
specified in laws and legal provisions for higher education, such 
practices may be interpreted as a violation of economic 
responsibility. 
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The social responsibility frame is even more complex than 
legal and economic responsibility frames. Some may call it a 
public interest perspective, as noted by Arora. 55 Public interest 
perspective refers to the common well-being or general social 
welfare, and the social responsibility frame implies the 
dominance of similar priorities. This frame anticipates that the 
HE! adheres to all legal and economic obligations and. in 
addition, performs its societal duties. I<~ducational, research, 
cultural, and other considerations are taken into account. The 
social responsibility frame views the HEI as an organization 
that conducts responsible research for the betterment of 
society, educates members of society in accordance with the 
best standards available, and disseminates knowledge to those 
who arc in need of it. Monetary transactions and the financial 
prosperity of an institution of higher learning are secondary in 
such cases. This is also known as a service for public good that 
increases total social welfare of the society. 
Finally, the moral or ethical responsibility is meant to move 
HE! to prioritize the issue of equity over the issue of quality, 
and quality over access. If, under the economic responsibility 
frame, a university sets its admission criteria and regulates the 
quality of educational services offered based on demand and 
supply in the education market, then the ethical responsibility 
anticipates equality in access to education and the provision of 
highest quality educational services under the conditions of 
maximizing the position of learners and the society overall 
rather than of profit maximization. 
While ethical, social, and economic frames are more 
universalistic, the legal responsibility frame is clearly nation-
specific. On the one hand, economic structures in the education 
sector vary by country and can be assigned to a few basic 
models. These basic models characterize access to higher 
education, funding of higher education, involvement of the 
state in financing and decision-making, organization and 
financing of research activities and dissemination of research 
results, and other fundamental aspects of higher education 
sector organization and functioning. On the other hand, legal 
perspective can allow for future perspectives rather than 
simple comparisons. As different national higher education 
systems develop and their regulation and legislations change, 
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laws reflect such changes and developments. Experiences of 
other nations and comparative perspective as applied to higher 
education corruption are of little help, because the U.S. higher 
education system is unique in the way it is organized and 
funded. The U.S. higher education sector may be described as 
decentralized, market-oriented, and autonomous. Other 
developed nations, including the European Union, have 
centralized higher education sectors that may be characterized 
by weak links with businesses and slowly emerging market-
like practices. Educational loans are becoming more common in 
these developed nations. Hence, national legislations already 
reflect such practices and will most likely develop further. 
Recent dramatic increase in the fees charged in HEis in the 
United Kingdom is a good example of such a change. While the 
process of commoditization of higher education in the United 
States continues, it is only emerging in Europe. 
Corruption is broader than it is defined in legal cases. At 
the same time, the level of legal responsibility from the set of 
legal, economic, social, moral, or ethical responsibilities is used 
to qualify deeds as corrupt. But even this approach docs not 
cover all the areas. There are so-called grey areas that may be 
judged as corrupt, while not illegal. Norms of contractual 
behavior accepted by society go ahead of legislation. The series 
of investigations launched by the New York State Attorney 
General is a classic example of grey area application. The 
Attorney General investigated numerous HEis of the matter of 
fraud and conflict of interest in the triangle of relations 
between students as consumers of educational services, 
financial institutions as providers of student loans, and HEis' 
financial officers as facilitators of such transactions. Later, 
study abroad programs offered by HEis also fell under the 
investigation in addition to the student loans schemes and 
preferred student-loan providers lists. These series of 
investigations and the ways in which the problems under 
investigation were resolved leads to new, more precise, specific, 
and contextual interpretation of existing laws, and results m 
new provisions, regulations, and codes of conduct. 
B. Selection of Cases 
The U.S. case law regarding corruption in higher education 
includes: collusion and fraud in educational lending, 
questionable quality of educational programs, the manner of 
162 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW ,JOURNAL f2012 
credentials evaluation and accreditation, attempts to 
monopolize discretion over admissions decisions. research 
misconduct, embezzlement of university funds, and general 
fraud. 56 Some of these cases are broadly publicized in the 
media and discussed in scholarly literature. 57 Others are only 
briefly mentioned in the specialized media sources that focus 
on problems of higher education, even though they may 
represent a legal precedent with a potentially large future 
impact on the industry. 5x These cases are significant and affect 
H B~ls, as well as educators, students, parents, and the general 
public. The cases to he analyzed are at the core of the 
development and reform of the higher education industry. They 
reflect processes of decentralization, commercialization, and 
marketization of higher education. The case law also exposes 
problems with the coordination, quality assurance, and state 
control in the industry. 
The selection criteria restrict the study to significant cases 
of corruption in higher education, hence preserving a higher 
degree of relevance for this study, while at the same time 
maintaining a reasonable level of abstraction to retain clarity 
of the issues surrounding the cases. For instance, if the United 
States Code Service (U.S.C.S.) reports on a case of 
embezzlement of public funds committed by an administrative 
staff member in a public HEI, such a case will not he 
considered in this study. First of all, embezzlement is not 
limited to the higher education sector. This practice is not 
distinct but rather common for all industries, including both 
public and private sectors. Second, if the case of embezzlement 
is clear, it is therefore not worthy of study. However, the way 
the court determined whether the case should he considered 
under the corruption law may be of interest, as it implies a 
problem of definitions. ln a hypothetical case whl~re a 
university administrator and a custodian or subcontractor 
collude in order to unlawfully benefit from a certain operation, 
a court will only consider the case if the net benefit obtained in 
:)(). See court cases and decisions, Wr,st's Federal Practicr• Digest ,Jth, 1 KA-1 KB 
(1999): and West's Fe<kral Practice Digest 1th. 1KB. CumulativP Annual l'ockPt Part 
(2007). 
:)7. Sec SYKI·:c:. supra note :l9 (discussing tfw price fixing investigation of Lhr• so-
called overlap group in 1991 ). 
61-\. See Martin VanDer Wr,rf. Lawsuit U, THE CHIWN. OF lli<:Ht·:li EllU<' .. Aug. 1. 
200ti. at A2:l, rwailablc at htLp:l/chronicle.com/article/Lawsuit-U/19(i6K. 
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an illegal way sums up to $5,000 or higher. If, however, the net 
benefit adds up to less than $5,000, the state statutes on 
corruption will not apply. Hence, if a public university overpaid 
a private contractor for the services rendered as a result of 
improper collusion between the administrator and 
subcontractor, the court will focus on the sum of the immediate 
damage. This study tends to focus on the nature and essence of 
a particular misdeed, rather than on the net benefit and the 
appropriate statutory limitations that may apply, depending on 
the state legislation. Simply put, for the court, the issue is both 
illegality and the size of illegally obtained benefit, while for 
this study the case of corruption exists no matter whether the 
total benefit was more or less than $5,000. In addition, if an 
alleged collusion took place between relatives, then this study 
would classify such a case as an example of embezzlement, 
nepotism, and fraud. Another limitation is concerned with clear 
cases of corruption. In such cases, no additional research is 
needed to establish the case of corruption, since it was already 
established by the court. 
C. Analysis and discussion 
Many of the cases of corruption in higher education, 
including those discussed and analyzed in this paper, were 
settled out of court. The fact that there are few court cases 
means rare legal precedents in corruption in higher education 
can really be drawn out for legal analysis. The analysis and 
discussion is organized to expand on the notion of grey areas in 
the higher education sector brought upon by the lack of case 
law on the matter. The analysis and discussion of the cases 
presented in this study seek to answer the following questions. 
First, what is the essence of each case? What are the 
underlying interests of groups involved, including consumers 
and providers of educational services, regulatory authorities, 
legislators, and the state in general? Second, is the case new, or 
were there earlier precedents or attempts to create a precedent 
on a similar case? Third, are there new ways to interpret the 
old rules and laws that are used in the case? Fourth, how is the 
case positioned in the context of educational reforms and socio-
economic processes in society in general? 
As demonstrated by the questions above, this study is 
focused on addressing sequences of events or case law, namely: 
any existing or possible commonalities or fundamentals, 
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similar fundamentals, socio-economic context, trends in the 
education industry, and processes of modernization and reform 
in society. 
There is also an additional set of questions that may be 
addressed in the analysis and the discussion. First, what is the 
degree and direction of the governmental interference in each 
of the cases? Here, we attempt to consider the government in a 
broader sense than just a legislative branch that includes 
prosecutors and the court system. Second, what are the 
possible future implications of the processes, cases, and legal 
decisions made? Are there any spillovers or potential for 
spillovers on other national educational systems? Broader 
spillovers into the European Union and the developing nations 
may be possible. Third, do the findings support our definition of 
corruption in higher education? 
D. Discussion of cases 
Several corruption cases involve universities recmvmg 
federal funds when they may have been ineligible. These types 
of cases involve receipt of federal funds when ineligible, loan 
provider monopolies, corrupt admission practices, federal grant 
spending, educational quality fraud and research fraud, and 
false advertising. For example, a case involving the University 
of Phoenix points to federal funds received by the University in 
the form of student aid. 59 The University might have been 
ineligible because of non-compliance with certain federal laws 
and regulations. The case was developed on the grounds of the 
False Claims Act and anticipated possible fraud between state 
and university relations.60 The University of Phoenix case is 
not an exception when it comes to allegations and even charges 
of a large-scale fraud in the higher education sector. A similar 
case involves Chapman University, which received federal 
funds in the form of student aid, but might have been ineligible 
as we11. 61 The major challenge in the Chapman University case, 
considered in 2006, was the instruction time necessary to 
receive credit hours. As a result, students might have been 
defrauded because of insufficient instruction time, and the 
S9. $:JSII-A1illion .Judgment Against If. of l'hoenix<> Parent Companv Is 
Neinstutcd. 'l'IIE Ci!I{()"'ICLJ•: OF HJ(:I!Jm EllLJCATION, .Jmw ~:l. ~010. cwuiluhlc ut 
http:l/chronich,.com/blogl'osti~HO-Million-.Judgnwnt-Against-/25(H(j/. 
60. !d. 
61. Sec Van Der Werf. supra note• 77. 
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state was defrauded as well. The state offers educational loans 
to students enrolled in accredited colleges. If it were known 
that the university failed to provide sufficient instruction, it 
would not be accredited and, hence, its students would not be 
eligible for state financial aid. 62 
Corruption can also take place in student-university 
relations and in state-university relations. In 2007, New York 
State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo launched an 
investigation to uncover some suspicious practices related to 
the lists of preferred providers of student loans administered 
by colleges' financial aid officers. 63 The government conducted 
the investigation on the basis of students being defrauded and 
guided to more expensive loans by college administrators. The 
case under investigation points to possible attempts to 
establish a near-monopoly and to defraud students on the local 
markets of educational loans. Students receive financial 
educational loans through university financial aid officers. 
These officers, as university employees, are subject to rules and 
regulations set by the university in accordance to the federal 
law. Universities have to comply with the federal government if 
they receive federal funding in any form. Thus, the state and 
students may be defrauded by the university due to 
noncompliance of some of the university's officers-particularly 
financial aid officers.64 
Another broadly publicized case initially involved Stanford 
University, but was later joined by a few other colleges.65 The 
major considerations of the case were overhead payments of up 
to seventy-four cents on every dollar received in the form of 
federal grants, and also issues with how some of the federal 
()2. Jd. 
6:l. Press l{elease. Attorney General Andrew Cuomo l-aunches Broad J~xpansion of 
lnuesti!{ation into Potential Conflicts of Interest in the Student Loan Industry, STi\TE OF 
NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE ATTOI\NEY GENERi\L, Feb. 1, 2007. 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2007/feh/feh01a_07.html. 
61. !d. 
65. United States Biddle v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford ,Jr. 
University, No. 96-16911 (9th Cir. 1997), auailable at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-
9th-circuit/1271717.html ("Paul Biddle appeals the district court's dismissal of his 
cause of action f()f lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Biddle brought a qui tam lawsuit 
against the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford, Jr. University ('Stanford') 
pursuant to the False Claims Act ('FCA'), :n U.S.C. § ::l7:JO, alleging that Stanford 
defrauded the United States Government. Because the district court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction over Biddle's lawsuit, we affirm."). See also Press Release, Lawsuit 
A!{ainst Stanford University Dismissed, STi\NFORO UNIVI•:RSI'I'Y NEWS SERVIn:, Aug. 
29, 1996, available at http://news.stanford.edu/pr/96/960829lawsuit.html. 
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research money was spent, including the centerpiece of the 
scandal-a yacht. 66 The case implied possible fraud in state-
university relations. Stanford University reached an out of 
court agreement with the government and the university 
reported that "The agreement between the university and the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) settles all disputed matters 
related to the billing and payment of indirect costs of federally 
sponsored research at Stanford for the fiscal years 1981 
through 1992. In addition to finding that the government has 
no claim for wrongdoing, the settlement upholds the validity of 
'Memoranda of Understanding' previously reached between the 
government and the university."67 The initial allegations and 
claims made by the government totaled $200 million, which in 
2012 would mean around a half-a-billion dollars, but the 
university eventually paid the government only $1.2 million.('X 
The culture of denial of any wrongdoing is obviously present in 
this case, as follows from the letter of the President of Stanford 
University. 69 Along with the culture of denial, the focus on the 
university's central mission always comes to play when 
external allegations are made by the outsiders. Moreover, the 
university manages to rip the benefit from this apparent crisis, 
with its president stating that, "As we put this matter behind 
us, we rea1ize that Stanford did harvest some benefit from this 
episode. We did obtain a thorough outside review of our 
internal controls, and we tightened them and improved our 
systems."70 
()(). ;\:-.JIJEI!c;O)i. supra note :Hl. at 170-71. 
()7. Stanford, gouenunent Cl,l.{l'('(' to settle dispute oPer research costs. ST.\:-.ii'OI{Il 
N 1-:ws SI·:I!VICI·:. Oct. 1 H. 1 !J~H. rwuilable ut http://twws.stanfonl.edu/ 
pr/~J-1/9-11 018Arc 10~JO.html. 
l1K. "Umh:r tPrms or tlw sl'ttiPnwnt, th<' univr:rsity will pay $1.2 million to th(' 
govc:nmwnt in a final adjustment covpring th(' 12 yr:ars and withdntw its own claims 
that tlw univPrsity had br•c:n undPrpaid during 1991 and 1992 ... Tlw agn•r•nwnt <'tHis 
sc:vl'ral yPars or contl·ovprsy during which aiiPgations wl'n' madP that tlw univr·t·sit:.-
owPd thP govr•rnnwnt as much as hundn:ds of millions of dollars f(,r incorrpctly 
calculating thr· indirPct costs of doing n:sr•arch. Ovr•1· thl' coursr· of thPsl' 12 vr•ars, 
Stanf(Jrd crmductpd n•s<'arch undl'r nParly 18.000 f(:dc:rall.v sponson•d contracts and 
gr;mts involving many millions of transactions and dollars." !d. 
()9. "Wr• Y'l'I-,'Tl'l thl' c:rrors and inappropriatr• chargr·s. But Wl' also n•gn•t 
irn•sponsihll' accusations questioning thl' intPntions and intPgrity of Stanfiml and 
univPrsity officials. Throughout this controvr•rsy. wr• ass('rtr•d that Stanford has donl' 
no wrong. This sdll('nwnt confirms that helir:f. Wr: conciudr: this sl'ltlr•nwnt with a 
spnsr• of l'('Jipf. With it br:hind us, Stan tim! can dr•votl' its attPntion fully to its ongoing 
mission of tr•aching and n•sr:arch on tlw fronti('rs of know!r-dgr•." !d. 
70. !d. 
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Cases built on the grounds of anti-trust regulation have 
also been considered. One of the major cases that attempted to 
establish possible corruption in admissions involved the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a number of Ivy 
League colleges in 1990.71 The colleges were making 
agreements with each other prior to admitting graduate 
students in order to reduce the total cost of offerings in the 
form of scholarships and financial aid. Instead of competing for 
the best and brightest student candidates among themselves by 
offering these students highest bids, these universities formed 
an improvised pool or a cartel. This implies monopoly in 
admissions, collusion, and consumer fraud. The colleges 
admitted wrongdoing and stopped the practice. 72 The only 
exception was MIT, which fought back and won on appeal, 
pointing to its non-profit status: 
All of the Ivy League schools signed a consent decree agreeing 
to stop the challenged cooperative activity. MIT refused to 
sign and went to trial. In September of 1992, MIT was found 
to have violated the Sherman Act. Government investigations 
against several schools outside of the Ivy League continued. 
Soon after the trial ended, Congress passed the Higher 
Education Act of 1992, allowing colleges and universities to 
engage in certain cooperative conduct aimed at concentrating 
aid only on needy students. In September of 1993, the court of 
appeals overturned the district court's verdict and ordered a 
new trial. The Government subsequently dropped all 
investigations against other schools and reached a settlement 
with MIT that allows MIT to engage in most of the conduct 
that the Government had challenged.73 
71. "In 1991, the U.S. Department of .Justi~e's Antitrust Division ('the 
Government') sued the Massachusetts Institute of '[\,chnology ('MIT') and the eight 
colkges and universities in the 'Ivy League'-Brown University, Columbia University. 
Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard College, Princeton University, the 
University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University. According to the Government, thP 
nine schools violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a conspiracy to 
restrain price competition for students receiving financial aid. The Government 
claimed that the schools conspired on financial aid policies in an effort to reduce aid 
and therdJy raisl' their revemws." GUSTAVO K BAMBEI(GER AND DENNJS W. CAI{LTON. 
Al'\TITRUST ANIJ HICHEI{ [•;DUCATlON: MIT FINANCIAL AID Hl8 (199::l), available at 
http://www .oup.com/us/pdt/kwoka/97HO 1 95:l22972 __ 07. pdf. 
72. "'The schools responded that the Sherman Act did not apply to them becausl' 
they ane not-for-profit institutions. Furthermon,, they justified their woperative 
behavior by explaining that it enabled them to ~oncentrate aid only on those in need 
and thereby helped the schools to achieve their socially desirable goals of "need-blind" 
admission coupled with finan~ial aid." /d. 
7:3. Jd. at 189 (internal citations omitted). See also U.S. v. Brown University, 
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It is within the Attorney General's purview to prosecute 
cases that imply monopolistic agrecments. 74 
In their article Complexities in Legislative Suppression of 
Diploma Mills, George GoUin, Emily Lawrence, and Alan 
Contreras discuss the legislative aspects of the problem of 
diploma mills, concluding: "We believe that the legal and 
enforcement components of the solution lag behind, and arc 
deserving of greater attention from federal authorities in the 
United States."75 They further discuss the federal interest in 
regulating diploma mills, and the problems that the 
government faces: 
There is a natural federal interest in helping the states 
suppress the illegal sale of academic degrees. But the only 
organized federal response to the problem of diploma mills 
was discontinued by the FBI in 1991, some years before the 
Internet-driven boom in the degree mill business began. 
Though it sued the "University Degree Program" in 200:3, the 
Federal Trade Commission did so as a secondary action to 
accompany its complaint regarding fake international drivers' 
licenses that the organization had been selling. The few 
criminal cases that have been brought in recent years have 
relied on mail and wire fraud statutes. But degree mill 
customers generally understand the true nature of the 
product they purchase. In the recent prosecution of the St. 
}{egis University diploma mill, the defense argued that there 
was no fraud, since willing customers bought these diplomas 
knowing they were not legitimate degrees. 76 
A number of cases involving diploma mills included state-
university relations, consumer-university relations, and degree 
holder-employer relations. 77 Cases of educational quality fraud 
..t.al., SOG F. Supp. 2:-lil (I•:. D. Pa. 1 ~Hl2): U.S. v. Brown Uniwrsity. c>t a!., :) F.:ld (;;,s 
(:lrd Cir. 19H:l). 
71. 1\•oplc> v. Dorsey. 29 N.Y.S. G:l7 (N.Y. Co. Ct. HHI) (holding that tlw attorm•y 
gc>Ill'ral had power to pros<Ocut.e for offpm·,•s committ.c>d a;; part of tlw nwan;;, phtn. or 
ocfH'IllC by which violation;; of S;l,l(), prohibiting monopolil'S Wl'Y'l' l'fft•dc>d. and anY 
criminal .act dom> in furtherancl' of a violation of such section was subj,·,·t to 
inv<>sLigat.ion and prosl'cution by t.lw attorney gc>Iwnd). 
75. (}eorgc> Collin. Emil:-' Lawn•nc" & Alan Contreras, Complexities in IA·.~·islative 
Suppression of /Jiploma Mills. 21 ST,\:--J. L. & I'OL'Y l{t•:v. 1, :l2 (201 0). 
7!;. !d. at :l (internal citations omitted). 
77. See, j(Jr instance, lndictnwnt, Unitl•d State;; v. Ran dock. No. CH-05-01 ilO-LltS 
(E.D. Wash. 200:-l), 2005 WL 5K9000(); 1\•rmanent Injunction and Final .Judgnwnt 
Again;;t Dd'endant llassan II. Safavi at 2, Am. Univ. Haw .. Inc .. No. O:l-1-015il(:2) 
(.Jww I :l. 20()(;), available at http://hawaii.gov/dcca/an•as/ocp/udgi/lawsuits/AUH/ 
american _u_hawaii_hhs.pdf. 
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involve consumers or students, providers or colleges, and 
accreditation agencies. Research fraud involves the state as the 
major source of funding, while the medical fraud committed in 
university hospitals involves patients and msurance 
companies. 
The cases of corruption in higher education selected for this 
study include the most recent developments in college funding, 
including ties between colleges and the educational loan 
industry. The investigation initiated by the New York State 
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo based on the False Claims 
Act was followed by another twenty-seven states throughout 
the country. As a result of the massive legal campaign 
launched by Attorney General Cuomo, dozens of public, 
private, and private for-profit colleges and about a dozen 
private student loan providers agreed to comply with the ethics 
rules offered by the Attorney General. n 
Two other cases based on the False Claims Act include 
Chapman University, a for-profit educational institution based 
in California,79 which was accused by the state of defrauding 
its students, playing on the mismatch between students' 
financial aid and academic abilities, and the case with the 
University of Phoenix. The Higher Education Act prohibits 
colleges and universities whose students receive federal 
financial aid from paying their recruiters based on the number 
of students enrolled. ~0 This provision is intended to discourage 
78. Bill Schackner, Private Student /,oan Scandal Yields Reforms, PJTTSBUR(;H 
POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.post-gazl'ttP.com/ 
pg/0801:1/8Fi6700-298.stm#ixzz170GfKDc,D. 
79. "A fl:deral judge in California on Tuesday ckared the way for three formc:r 
adjunct professors at Chapman University to sue the institution under the Falsp 
Claims Act, which permits lawsuits by an individual who hPliews he or she has 
identifled fraud committed against the federal governmPnt, and who sues hoping to ht> 
joined hy the U.S .• Justice Dc:partment. (The plaintiff then shares in any financial 
pPnalties. which can include trebh:d damages.) In siding with those who sued 
Chapman, Judge ,James V. Selna not only cited the' Seventh Circuit's decision in United 
StatPs of America ex. rei. Jeffrey E. Main v. Oakland City University as a key 
precedent, but expanded on it in significant ways. Most notably. the judge concludes 
that a college can run afoul of the False Claims Act by violating a requirement imposed 
not directly by the federal government but by an accrediting group-a position the 
,Justice Department endorsed." Doug Lederman, l~ver-Expanding False Claims Act. 
!:--.!SIDE HH:HER En, May 26, 2006, available at http://www.insidehighen:d.com/ 
news/2006/0Fi/26/false#ixzzldcqLUgDk. See also U.S. v. Chapman University, 2006 WL 
1 Fi622:ll (C. D. Cal. 20(J4). 
80. Press Helease, Attorney General Andrew Cuomo Launches /Jroad l{xpansion of 
Investigation into Potential Conflicts of Interest in the Student Loan Industry, STATE OF 
NEW YORK OFFICE OF 'I'HI•; ATTORNEY GENERAL, Feb. 1, 2007, 
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recruitment of unqualified students. If this provisiOn is 
violated, then the False Claims Act may be enacted. In the case 
of Chapman University, the complaint says that the 
institution, as part of the accreditation process, certified that it 
was giving the required amount of classroom instruction in its 
academic programs, when it was not.x 1 If it had revealed the 
truth, the complaint alleges, Chapman would not have been 
accredited and would be ineligible to receive federal grants and 
student loans. Xl 
University of Phoenix is the largest private HEI in the 
United States.x3 This for-profit HEI enrolls over half-a-million 
students, 80%> of which receive federal aid in the form of 
student loans and grants.x4 In the 2008-2009 academic year, 
the University of Phoenix hosted 2:10,77 4 students recipients of 
Pell Grants, receiving the revenue of 656,900,000.x5 In 2008, 
the total sum of financial aid received by the University of 
Phoenix students amounted to almost $2.5 billion. The 
http://www.ng.ny.gov/nwdia cl'ntpr/2007/fl'hift:b01a_07.html. 
1-\1. "Tiw suit (O'Connell. ct al. L'. Chapman University), which was l'ilt•d undl'r tlw 
fed('ral Faist' Claims Act. allcgcs that Chapman fa]sp]y rl'pn•st•ntl'd itst•lf during an 
accn•ditation l'l'Vil'w in t>nll'r to quali(v for federal funds. Tlw United Staks Dis I riel 
Court for Lhl' Cl'ntral District of California grantl'd summary judgnwnt in favor of I lw 
univl'rsity in 2007. Tlw plaintiffs appl'~tlt•d to thl' U.S. Court of Appt•als for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
Tlw plaintiffs. who Wl'rt' adjunct facull:v nwmhl'rs. :tllegPd that hl'cansl' somt· facult~· 
rPit:>lsPd studl'nts t•arl~· from sonw class('s. Chapman was not in compliann• with 
anTt•ditat.ion standards. Chapman is fully :wcrPditt•d by Uw regional :ll'lTPdilor. the 
WcstPrn Association of Schools and Collt•gl's." !1('/,' Submits Amicus /Jriel in Chapman 
l!niuersity Accreditation Cuse. 'I'HI·: IIMI-:1{1('.\N COLI'H'IL 0:--1 l~llliC,\TION, .Junt• 1, 20m!. 
cn·ailablc at http://www.acl'nl'l.l'du/AM/Tt•mplatl'.cfmSt•ction=l lome&( '(JNTENTIIJ= 
:l2tiG7&TEM I'Ll\'I'E=/CM/Contl'nt!Jispla:v.cfm. Sec also lJ .S. ex rei. O'Conntdl v. 
Chapman Univ .. 21fi F.IUJ. ()1() ({'.D. Cal. 2007). cert. denied. U.S. v. Chapman 
Uniwn;ity.1:n S.Ct.2,112(2011). 
1-\2. /d. 
1-i:l. !\bout l!niuersit.v ol l'hoenix, UNI\'EJ(SJTY 01·· I'IIOI·::--JJ\, 
http://www.phm·nix.t•du/about_us/about_uniwrsit:v of phm·nix.html (l:lst visitt•d Feb. 
(i. 2012). 
H·l. '''l'hl' UnivPrsity of l'hm~nix (UOI'X), with rwarlv mw half million sl udents, is 
thP sr•cond largPst highr•r t,ducation s:vstl'm in Uw U.S., spcond on!~- t.o tlw Statr• 
Univt~rsit:v of NPw York." .Jorge Klor dP Alva, Nn-- l'ro/it Colleges and Unirwrsities: 
A111erica's !~east Costly and Most 8/ficient System o/llig11er J•;ducution Case Stu.dy-
Unir•asitv o/1'/wenix. l',\SJ•: S'i'L!ll!ES 01'\ I'UBJ,J(' I'OLI<'Y ,\Nil HICI!Im EllliC.\TIO"'. 27 
(Aug. 201 0), htt.p:lltwxusn:sl'arch.org/11NPxusStudvi-i-:l1-1 O.pdf. See also .John 
L~nwrman, For-l'roji:t Colleges Facing l~oss ol Taxpayer Funds Fighting Aid Ulllit. 
BL<Hl~lllEIUi, -Jan. 12. 2011. http://www.bloomhPrg.com/nt:ws/20 11-01-12/for-pmfil-
collegl's- facing- taxpayer-funds-loss- tlgh t-aid- I i mit. h tm I. 
1-\5. Nn·-f'rolit Colleges Capitalize on !'ell Grant HeiJelllli'. 'I'HI·: CHJ{()f\J<'LE OF 
III<: H I•:H l•:lllll'Nl'ION. .Jan. -1, 2010, http://chronick.com/articlt>/Dal a -!'oint,;- Fm-
1 'rofi t!():l:l81-i. 
1] LEGALITY VERSUS CORRUPTIBILITY 171 
allegations mounted that the University wrongfully obtained 
around $3 billion in federal funds.x 6 This money was at stake 
under the False Claims Act provision that requires the 
recovery of triple the full amount of money. 117 The plaintiffs 
(i.e., the whistleblowers) are entitled to 15%> or more of the 
total recovered sum. xx It was unlikely from the very beginning 
of this affair that the government would try to deprive the 
University of Phoenix of billions of dollars for this sum is 
simply way too big. Also, the whistleblower cases based on the 
False Claims Act may be highly expensive, especially if they 
proceed to trial.X9 The $78.5 million settlement reached in 
December of 2009 includes $11 million as statutory attorneys' 
fees and costs. The whistleblowers received $19 million and the 
U.S. Department of Education received $48.5 million. 90 
It is interesting that the government declined to intervene 
as a party plaintiff in the cases, but nevertheless received its 
share of compensation money. In theory, all a whistleblower 
has to do is to blow a whistle on a company that in his/her view 
is involved in violation by committing fraud against the federal 
government and then sit and wait to see how the case turns out 
in order to collect his/her share. In reality, however, a 
whistleblower has to find a private attorney first and then try 
to convince the government to join in the legal action. But often 
even this formula does not work. The government, not the 
whistleblower, stays aside of the legal action awaiting its 
outcome in order to collect. 
Some cases involving corruption in higher education 
involved claims of false advertising. For example, Corinthian 
86. Admissions Lawsuit University of Phoenix Faces May Cost 80 Million. 
GET EllUCATED.COM. http://www .geteducated.com/online-education -facts -and-
sta ti stics!l a test-online-learning-news-and-research/:l02-a d missions-lawsuit-university-
of-phoenix-faecs-may-cost-80-million (last visited Fe h. 6, 2012). 
87. :n U.S.C. § :l729(a)(1) (2011). 
88. 1:ypes of Fraud, WHISTU:BlllWEf!LAWS.COM. 
http://www.whistlchlowerlaws.com/types-of-fraud/ (last visited Fd>. 6, 2012). 
89. The' Univc,rsity of Phoenix whistlehlower case (U.S. ex rei. Hendow v. Univ. of 
Phoenix, Civil Action No. 2:0:1-cv-00157-GEB-DAD (KD. Cal. 2006)) settled after the 
trial team reviewed over a million pages of documents, took or defended close to forty 
depositions, and had retained several experts. The case was set to be tried in March 
2010. hpfore the parties reachc'd settlemlmt in December of 2009. See $78.5 Million 
Settlement in Whistlcblower Lawsuit against Unioersity of Phoenix, BLJSI0imiSWIHII, 
De, c. 11. 2009, http://www. husincsswirc.com/portal/sitc/homo/pennali nk/? 
ndm View I d=news_ view&ncwsl d=20091214006155&newsLang=cn. 
90. Denny Walsh, Sacramento Whistle-Blowers to Share U. of Phoenix Settlement, 
SAC:f!AME:-.1'1'0 BEE, Dec. 15, 2009, at :JA. 
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Colleges, Inc. agreed to pay $6.5 million to settle allegations 
that the for-profit operator of vocational schools engaged in 
false advertising. 91 Corinthian Colleges, Inc. allegedly 
overstated the percentage of its students who obtained 
employment via its courses, inflated their starting salary 
information, and used these misrepresentations to persuade 
potential students to enroll. Of the settlement amount, $5.8 
million went to restitution for students. 92 Corinthian operates 
more than one-hundred other schools in the United States and 
Canada. The settlement required that Corinthian cease 
offering eleven courses for eighteen months, including the 
Pharmacy Technician program in Anaheim, CA. 9 -' In the first 
case, there was a settlement achieved and the university 
ultimately agreed to a settlement of $6.5 million in restitutions, 
penalties, fines, and compensatory payments, while the second 
case was settled at $78.5 million after seven years of 
litigationY4 The summary of the reviewed cases is presented m 
Table 1. 
91. l'ress i{elease. l!ro1N1 Ucuchcs Multi·Million Settlement with Corinthian 
Voculionul School, S'i'i\'1'1<: OF CALJI<'OI(l\li\ DEI':\Il'l'l\11•:~'1' OF ,JlJS'I'In: (Ji.'l'l<'l•: OF TfH: 
i\'i'TOI!NI·:Y G l·:~lm.\1 ..• July :n. 2007. http://oag·.ca.gov/news/press_n>lt>as<•'!id=1 •1·H. 
92. Andrew (;alvin. Corinthian to l'ay $6.5 Million. OCI{I•:<:IS'I'I·:IC Aug. 1. 2007. 
h ttp://articlt•s.ocregist.Pr.com/2007 ·Oil·O 1 /husitwss/2·170il9:l2_ 1_cori nth i:~ n ·studt•n Li· 
corinthian·collt>g<>s·sdt.lenwnt. Sec olso Closs Action Suit Filed Agoinsl Corinthian 
Colleges, Inc. on lkhulf of Medical Assistant l'rogTwn Students, 1'1{ NI•:WSWIIn<:. Mar. 
12. 2001-l. http://www. pnwwswin:.com/m•ws· rp lt•ast•s/cl ass·action ·suit· filed ·against. 
corinthian ·co II c:ges ·inc ·On· behalf. of. nwd iu t! ·ass is tan(. program ·S ttl' I en Is· 
ilti902•122.html. 
~J:l. !d. 
~H. $78.5 M1:Lll:on Settlement in Whistleblower tuwsuit A,<(uinst Uni1•ersity ol 
l'hocnix. IWSINI·:sc:WIIU:, D<•c. 11. 20m1. 
!1 ttp://www. busi twsswirP .com/port:~llsitc/home/pcrma li nk/'1nd 111 Vit>W I d=m•w,;-viPw&nt• 
wsld=2009121100G15:)&nt>wsLang=cn. The lawsuit. fih;d in March 200:1. alleged that 
tlw University' of l'h<"'nix had dd'raudt•d Lht• U.S. lkpartnwnt of Education bv 
obtaining fedl'ral student loans :md ft•dPral grants bast•d on false statPnwnts of 
complianet• with tht• Hight>r Education Act. The Univ<•rsity of Phoenix pt't>Viousl:-' 
aln;ady paid $9.il million to tlw U.S. Dt>partnwnt of l•;ducation in 2001 to n>solvt• 
:Hhninistr:Jt.ive cl:1in1s t.hat. it. was paying in1propPr incPntive cnnlpt•nsation to its 
recruil.t>rs. In 2005, the trial judgt> dismisst>d thP action against tlw Univ<·rsity of 
l'hm>nix on the ground that tlw Universitv's t't•rlifications of complianc<· with tht• 
II ight•r Education Act did not constitutl> falst> clnims. In 2007. tlw ~inth Circuit 
n•vt;rsed that ruling and thL• case; n;Lunwd to tlw trial court. 
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Table 1: Cases on the Grounds of the False Claims Act, 
Consumer Protection Act, Higher Education Act, and 
Anti-Trust Laws after 2000 
University Plaintiff Ground Date Date Settlement Allegations Essence 
filed settlerl (in millions) 
Total Plaintiff 
Uniwrsity Fonner False Mar. Dec. $78.5 $28.0 Incentive State and 
of employees Claims 200~l 2009 pay fur COnsumL'r 
Phoenix, (two Act recruit- fraud 
Apollo adn1issions ment 
Group officers) 
Oakland Former False Mar. July $5.3 $1.4 Incentive State and 
City employee Claims 2003 2007 pay for consumer 
University (one director Act recruit- fraud 
of ment 
admissions) 
Chapman Former False Mar. Pending [ nsufficicnt State and 
University employees Claims 2005 instruction consumer 
(three Act tim'' fraud 
instructors) 
Corinthian State on Consumer July $6.5 $5.8 False Consumer 
Colleges behalf of Protectio 2007 advertising, fraud 
Inc. consumers, nAct unfair 
(class- business 
action) practices 
!~ducat ion State on Higher Mar. Apr. $2.0 $0 Preferred Consunu~r 
Finance he half of Education 2007 2007 student fraud, 
Partnurs consumers, Act, Anti- loan kickback 
(private (class- Trust providers 
student action) list 
loan 
provider) 
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UniversiLv Plaintiff 
Dozens of State on 
public, behalf of 
<:round !late llat<' 
Higher Mar. Fd1. 
Education 2007 2008 
private. consumers, Act, Anti-
and 
private 
for-profit 
collt>gt•s; a 
dozl'n 
privatP 
studL•nt 
loan 
providers 
(class-
action) 
Trust 
$HO $0 
Source: Completed by the author 
PrPfc•rred ConsunH•r 
student fraud. 
loan 
providers 
list 
kickback 
A few initial observations can be made about the presented 
legal cases. First, all False Claims Act-based cases with 
University of Phoenix, Oakland City University, and Chapman 
University were initiated by former employees. In the case of 
University of Phoenix, the whistleblowers were two admissions 
officers.95 In the Oakland City University case, it was the 
Director of Admissions. 96 The Chapman University case was 
initiated by three instructors who worked in precisely the areas 
which they later targeted as being in violation of federal law. 97 
In the first two cases, the issues were admissions policies and 
practices, while in the third it was instruction time. The law 
does not require plaintiffs or whistleblowers to be employees, or 
former employees, or have any affiliation; they just need to 
have knowledge of the violation. 9s Either transparency in 
operation of HEis is not very high, and so only immediately 
involved employees have the knowledge that can potentially 
form the necessary grounds for a legal challenge, or arguments 
of outsiders will not even be taken seriously by the court. 
Second, in all of the False Claims Act cases the government 
~J:). UnivL:rsiLy of Phoenix, supm note tlH. 
(Hi. U.S. l'X n•l. Main v. Oakland City UnivPrsity, 12() F.:ld (JH, 9](i (7th C'ir. 
200:)). False Claims Act cha!'gl!S n:latl'd to submission of allL'gL•dly f'alsl' statL:nwnts to 
tlw DL:partnwnt of Education in connection with eligibility to parLicipall' in thl' FPdL•ral 
Stmknt Loan Program. 
97. LL•dL•rman, supra notL: 79. 
~J8. :n U.S.C. ~ :l729. 
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has chosen to stay aside, limiting its involvement with citing 
its opinion in the form of the prosecutor's statement. The 
reason for this self-alienation is not particularly clear. Perhaps 
the government decided that the law firms will do the work of 
proving the case and seeking their legal fees while the 
government and the plaintiffs will obtain their share. What 
appears to be a cost-saving strategy on the side of the 
government may actually have some repercussions. 
Third, all of the lawsuits ended with out-of-court 
settlements. The sides did not proceed to trial. Even though the 
HEis adopted and reinforced some of their compliance policies, 
precedent has yet to come. 
Fourth, plaintiffs in the three False Claims Act-based cases 
are employees, and not customers whose interests are at stake 
of being jeopardized. Thus, the current legislation or the 
factual legal practices do not appear to be sufficiently 
protective of the customers. Rather than fight for consumer 
rights, employees initiate such cases in pursuit of their own 
benefits, which include the incentive of 15% of any recovery. 
This contradiction will eventually move the existing legislation 
to the need for updates and improvements. While the essence 
of each of the three cases is "state and consumer fraud," it 
appears that neither the state nor the consumers played the 
key role in the lawsuits. 
Fifth, these cases are complex and take years to settle. For 
instance, the University of Phoenix case took over six years to 
come to settlement. The government had little involvement in 
the case and yet received the lion's share of the settlement 
money, almost $50 million out of $78.5 million total.99 At the 
same time, the potential recovery, at least as follows from the 
False Claims Act, could have constituted over a billion dollars. 
Apparently, the government is not willing to pursue False 
Claims Act cases in higher education to the point where HEis 
can be left stranded without cash due to enormously high 
recovery payments to the government. The government 
recognizes ipso facto the existence of grey areas in the 
legislation that it drafts and enforces. 100 
99. Denny Walsh, Sacramento Whistle-Blowers to Share lJ. of Phoenix Settlement, 
SACilAMENTO BEE, Dec. 15, 2009, at :lA. 
100. Grey areas in this context are understood as refl)rring to conduct that may not 
he recognized as corrupt, hut also pointing to possible loophoks in the existing 
legislation. 
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Sixth, the government sued or intended to sue on behalf of 
consumers in the case of Corinthian Colleges, Inc. and the 
cases initiated by Attorney General Cuomo, which involved 
dozens of public, private non-profit colleges, and private for-
profit colleges and a dozen of private for-profit student loan 
providers, including Education Finance Partners. 101 Overall, 
these cases involve unfair business practices, such as false 
advertisement and partial monopolization of certain aspects of 
educational financing, which amounted to consumer fraud and 
resulted in kickbacks to college officials. Similar to the cases 
based on the False Claims Act, the pretrial settlements in 
these cases made it possible to avoid the creation of a legal 
precedent. 
The recent scandals of university financial aid officers, 
preferred educational loan providers lists, and possible 
kickbacks, investigated by Attorney General Cuomo, were 
highlighted in numerous media publications and can be 
analyzed through the proposed classification frame. Such 
analysis will help reveal whether the cases represent 
corruption of higher education and expose the essence of each 
case. In some cases investigated by Attorney General Cuomo. 
financial aid officers suggested a particular private bank-
lender to students. 102 The bank may not have had the best 
offerings for the students and would be ruled out otherwise. 
The non-competitive bank loan offers attract clients, which 
may constitute an act of fraud, a clear facet of corruption. What 
follows, then, is a need to determine if this is an intentional 
fraud or a result of negligence or incompetence. 
Intentional fnud takes place if financial aid officers in 
universities commit it with the expectation of personal or 
material gain. Material gain can come through holding shares 
in the bank placed on the preferred loan provider list or by 
receiving kickbacks in the form of consultation fees, gifts, etc. 
Thus, kickbacks here are the means of corruption. Banks might 
pay kickbacks deceptively worded as referral affiliate benefit 
packages to colleges' financial aid officers in the form of gifts. 
meals, accommodations, consulting fees, travel expenses, 
101. Press l{t•lease. Attorney General Andreu• Cuomo Announces First f~c.!.{u/ Action 
in Co/lege l~omr lndustr:v lnuestigolion, ST.\TI·: <W NI·:W YOI{K 01-'FWI•: Ill-' THI·: AT'I'Oil:.JI·:Y 
CI·:I\Eit\L, Mar. :m. 2007, http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia center/2007/mar/ 
mar22b 0/.html. 
102. !d. 
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registration fees, tuition waivers, and shares of the lending 
agencies. 103 Being on the preferred lender list increases the 
profitability of the bank, the profitability of the shares, and, 
hence, the revenue of the shareholders. Such practices raise 
several questions. Does this represent clear conflict of interest? 
Is this illegal? Is this against the university rules? Are such 
practices transparent? What rules are established and by 
whom? 
The locus of corrupt activities in this case includes access to 
higher education and possible breach of contract. The area 
primarily affected is access to higher education since a loan is 
intended to fund the recipient's education. Educational loans 
provided on non-competitive grounds reduce the degree of 
accessibility of higher education, arc more likely to increase 
student debt, and eventually lead to the withdrawal of more 
competitive providers of educational loans from the market. 
The practice of having a list of preferred loan providers may 
also constitute a breach of contract between the student and 
the university, if universities are under obligation to provide 
their current and prospective students with the best possible 
options in terms of educational loans, both private and public. 
Even if they are not under such obligation, the legal problem 
with kickbacks and preferred provider lists remains. 
The potentially corrupt interactions in the presented cases, 
investigated by Attorney General Cuomo, include business-
university relations with possible collusion between providers 
of educational loans and universities or admissions officers. 
They also include relations between students and college 
administration, where administrators commit possible fraud by 
presenting students with the preferred lenders list. Finally, 
these are potentially corrupt interactions between the state 
and HEis, including the investigations conducted and out-of-
court settlements achieved, as well as restitutions and 
voluntary acceptance of the code of conduct set by the state for 
the future. 
E. Legal argumentation 
The Higher Education Act of 1965 regulates the sphere of 
10:1 ld. See also Charlene Wear Simmons, Student Loans for Hikher l~ducation. 
CALIFORNIA STATE Lllll{ARY i{ESEARCH BUREAU, available at 
http :1 /www .I i brary .ca. gov/crb/0/l/08-002. pdf. 
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educational loans in the U.S. 104 However, some issues of 
consumer rights protection as well as state jurisdiction are still 
not clear. Parents can borrow a PLUS Loan to cover education 
expenses for dependent undergraduate students enrolled at 
least half-time in an eligible program at an eligible school. 105 
PLUS Loans are available through the Federal Family 
Education Loan (FFEL) Program and the William D. Ford 
Federal Direct Loan Program. 106 The eligibility of a student 
requires a high school diploma, the eligibility of parents 
requires good credit, and eligibility of the program and the 
college requires accreditation. Conditions apply to all 
governmental educational loans and to all the participants of 
this type of contract or transaction. However, colleges arc not 
under any responsibility to provide quality educational services 
to students, and hence students cannot return the funds 
received from state loans, if they have not received federal 
loans. 107 Student loans made, issued, or guaranteed under the 
Higher Education Act are also exempt from Federal Trade 
Commission rules on preservation of consumer defenses. 1 0 ~ 
The issue of educational loans and all the abuse associated 
with it extends beyond interactions between students and 
colleges, since colleges themselves do not hold student loans. 
The decision in Veal v. First Am. Sav. Banh states that the 
"rule that assignee who is not holder in due course takes 
instrument subject to defenses against assignor existing at 
time of assignment could not be used to charge lenders who 
granted guaranteed student loans with alleged fraudulent 
101. Higlwr Education Act of 1%5, 20 U.S.C. ~ 1070 (200fi). 
105. College /,ourz Options: /low lo '/HI a l'crhins from a J>LlfS. CoLLECI·: 1\(L\IW. 
http :1/www .co II egt• board .com/,; tmk n t/p; zy/lo; tn-ct •n !t > r/·1 :l:l. h t mI. 
1 (Hi. /d. 
107. Sec lliglwr I<:ducation i\ct of nlfi:-i. 211 U.S.C. ~ 10711: Vt•al v. First Am. S;tv. 
Bank, 91•1 F.2d 909, 91 :l (7th Cir. 1990) ("Stmh,nts could not St><'k n>scission of studt•nt 
lo<tns gu<u·anlped h:/ st.at.P nnd private agpncies on theory t.hat. heeausL~ of closL' 
conm•ction hl'IW<'<'n solvc•nt lmsizwss colle>gc> and lenders and olfwr dl'ft·ndanL;, 
defendants wen• subject to defense hase>d upon college's failurl' to provide stml<-nt with 
t•ducation: since loans W<>rt• gu;u·antt•ed by pt·ivnte nnd stal<> agencil's. rat ht·r than 
ft•dez·al govl'rnment, tlwy wr>n• not subjt>ct to protl'ctions of ft•dt•z·;tl n•gulations. under 
which deft•nse might he available in cases involving Fedt,ral lnsun'd Studt•nt Lo;ms 
and ft>dr>ral I'LLJS loans."). 
Ill~. Vcol. 9H F.2d at 9H (holding that studl'nt loans. madl', j,;,;twd. or 
guantnt<'<><L undPr HighPr Education Act m·t, l'Xt>mpt from ft>dl'ral trndl' Commission 
rull' on pn,st,rvation of consunwr ddi.•nse>s. under which consunwr credit. contracts 
must advice holde>rs of such contracts that they an• subject to all claims and defl'nses 
that dt,btor has against seller of goods and s<>rvice>s). 
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activities of insolvent business college, since college was never 
'holder' of student notes and lenders were never assignees of 
college." 109 This provision points to the need to better educate 
consumers about educational and affiliated financial services. 
Consumers of educational services must be aware of the 
quality, accreditation level, and the terms and conditions of 
educational loans. 
Attorney General Cuomo's investigations of educational 
loans and study abroad programs were based on the deceptive 
acts and practices provision of the Consumer and Borrower 
Protection Act. 110 As stated in the New York State legislation, 
"[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, 
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this 
state are hereby declared unlawful." 111 In cases of private 
educational loans, the consumer and borrower protections 
consider the borrower to be a consumer of financial services. 
This requires transparency and full disclosure of the terms and 
conditions under which the loan is furnished to the student. 
The essential elements of a violation of New York law 
prohibiting deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any 
business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service 
in New York are: "(1) proof that a 'consumer-oriented' practice 
was deceptive or misleading in a material respect, and (2) proof 
that plaintiffs were injured thereby." 112 There is, however, safe 
harbor for lenders and college financial aid officers in the state 
legislation. Specifically, the court does not accept claims about 
deceptive practices when such practices have been fully 
disclosed to the consumer. 113 
The excursion into legal definitions and peculiarities leaves 
many questions unanswered. For instance, both coercion and 
extortion are considered in the U.S. legislation. However, the 
bribe giver in coercion and extortion cases is considered to be a 
109. /d. 
110. .Justice Thomas A Dickerson, Consumer Law 2004 Update: The Judge's Guide 
to Federal and New Yorh State Consumer Protection Statutes, THE NEW YORK STATE 
.JUDICIAL SI•;MINAR PROGRAM 2001, ,July 21, 2001, available at 
http://www .nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/2001CONJ ,A W AI{']'. pdf. 
111. N.Y. GI•;N. Bus.§ iH9 (McKinney 201 0). 
112. Champion Home Builders Co. v. AD'l' Sec. Services, Inc., 179 F. Supp.2d H:i, 
27 (N.D.N.Y. 20ll1). 
11:1. Broder v. MBNA Corp., 722 N.Y.S.2d 521, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("There 
can he no sL•ction il19 (a) claim when the allegedly deceptive practice was fully 
disclosed."). 
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victim. But what about public employees and elected officials 
who are coerced by their supervisors to so1icit bribes and accept 
bribes? This anticipates the corruption and coercion policy as a 
mechanism of administrative control. And what about complex 
systems where bribes arc shared with supervisors and further 
up the hierarchical ladder or the hidden schemes and 
mechanisms of bribe collection and bribe sharing? The entire 
legal frame appears to be quite simplistic while the corrupt 
hierarchical structures, including those in the higher education 
sector, may be quite complcx. 114 
Legal provisions that exist in the legislation, including the 
Higher Education Act, False Claims Act, and Consumer 
Protection Act, cover the following three areas: (1) corruption 
as related to the state (a private individual bribes a public 
official in order to obtain unduly benefits); (2) corruption as 
related to client and business (a client (subcontractor etc.) is 
abusing a business by bribing the business' agent); and (:3) 
corruption as related to consumer and business (consumer 
fraud, when a business deceives a consumer). However, the 
legal framework is simplistic, while the system of 
interrelations in the higher education industry is rather 
complex. The Higher Education Opportunity Act includes 
provisions for education loans. 115 Specifically, the reauthorized 
Higher Education Opportunity Act furnishes prov1swns 
applicable to private student loans and specifies prohibited 
conduct. preferred lender arrangements, disclosures to 
borrowers, and self-certification. 116 
II ,1. For furtlwr discussion on complex corrupt systems. see. for instanct'. Ararat 
Osipian, Corruption Hierarchies in lhgher /•,'ducution in the I•!Jnner Soc•iet IJ/oc, 2~) 
I :'J'i'l<:t~ Ni\Tt ON,\ I, .J OU llN,\L 0 F Ell UCi\TIONAL lh:Vt•:LOI'M t•:c•J'I' :)21 , :l21-:l:l() (2009 ): i\ra rat 
Osipian, Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the J<IJT·mer .'louie! Uloc, I 7 TIL\:-\c;ITI0\1 
STIJillt<:S Ht<:VII•:W. Sl'lll)\(:tm K22. KK2-K:J6 (2010). 
11:). Text of ILK •11:)7 [llOthJ: Higlwr Education OpporLunitv /\ct. iWuiluhle at 
h ttp://frwe hga t e. access. gpo. gov /cgi-
hin/g't'tdoc.cgi'~dhnanw=l1 O_cong_hills&docid=f:h11 :l/ cnr. txt. pdf. Tlw Higher 
l•;ducation i\ct (H ]•;;\) was reauthorized by the US Congn•ss on .Jul:-· :ll. 200K. The 
Congn•ss passt•d the Higlwr Education Opportunity i\ct af'tt•r fourlt't•n extensions. five 
years af'tc•r lfw dc•adlirw. This bill was signed into law by l'n:sident Bush in Augu,;t 11. 
200K. 
1 Hi. IICt•: llnolysis o/ lligher Hdu.cation Act H('(lu/horization. /\~11<:1<1('<\:-..1 CoU\1('11. 
0:-..1 I<;IHI(';\TI0\1 1. 7 (/\ug. 200K), http://www.acend .. t'du//\M/'I\:mplatc•.cf'm''Section= 
St ·arch&sl'ction=( iovernnwn t_l{e lations& t c:m pia Le=/CM/ 
ContPntDisplay.cfm&Contc•ntFilt> I D=fi71 :) ("DisclosurPs t.o borrowc:rs: l.endc•r·s of 
private education loans must make certain disclosure's t.o horr<>WPrs in any application 
(or any solicitation that dol:s not rPquin: an application), as Wldl as at tlw timl' of loan 
approval and loan consummation. The disclosures must includt' information regarding 
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F. Implications 
There is a growing concern that higher education becomes 
more of a commodity offered to consumers. In one article, 
authors Tim Kaye, Robert D. Bickel and Tim Birtwistle point 
out that "[t]here is widespread concern that higher education is 
being compromised by being turned into a 'commodity' to be 
'consumed."' 117 In their attempt to explore the trends in both 
the U.K. and the U.S., and to consider how the law has 
responded to them, they argue that: 
There is an important distinction to be drawn between 
'commodification' and 'consumerism'. Education has always 
been a commodity to be bought and sold; the true danger lies 
in the move to a 'rights-based' culture where students (and 
politicians) see education merely as something to be 
'consumed' rather than as an activity in which to participate. 
Whilst the law seems thus far to have been something of a 
bulwark against this movement, it remains an open question 
as to whether this will continue to be the case if HEis do not 
themselves act more proactively in challenging this damaging 
view of higher education. 11 X 
It would be fair to say that when the terms "commodity" 
and "consumerism" are present, there should also be the term 
"credit" as well. Consumers routinely use consumer credit to 
acquire commodities ordinarily called consumer goods. 
In the U.S., using credit is a norm. Widespread consumer 
credit and the use of credit cards have taken place in American 
society for decades. The average American carries a credit card 
debt of several thousand dollars and considers it normal. 119 
Buying a house through a mortgage with a thirty-year 
repayment plan is also a norm. This is not the case in many 
other nations, and some are just turning to the culture of 
consumer credit. Others have had consumer credit on a limited 
the terms the terms of the private loans as well as federal student financial aid."). 
117. Tim Kaye, f{obl•rt D. Bickel & Tim Birtwistle, Criticizing the Image of the 
Student as Consumer: l~xamining Legal Trends and Administrative Responses in the 
U.S. and U.K., 18 EllUC. A:-.JIJ L. 85,85 (2006). 
118. !d. 
119. Credit Card JJebt Statistics, HOFFMAN, BH.INKEil &ROBER'I'S, 
http:l/www.hoffmanbrinker.com/crcdit-canl-debt-statistics.html ("In 2010, the U.S. 
census bureau is reporting that U.S. citizens have over $886 billion in credit card debt 
and that flgurp is expected to rise to $1.177 trillion this year. Mon' specifically, tlw 
report states that each card holder has an average credit card deht of $5,100 and this 
number is projected to reach $6,500 by the end of this year."). 
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scale for many years. Present consumption against future 
earnings is considered to be risky and a not very rational 
consumer behavior, especially in traditional societies. 
Educational loans face challenges in societies accustomed to 
consumer borrowing and those not accustomed to the culture of 
consumer credit. In the U.S., people are ready to accept 
educational loans as a part of their consumer credit culture 
that anticipates borrowing against future earnings. Moreover. 
as education is considered to be an investment good rather 
than consumption good, this type of consumption may be 
adopted even by the savvy and encouraged by the government. 
However, there are other loans in addition to educational loans. 
Lenders of educational loans will have to compete for 
customers not only among themselves but with the lending 
industry overalL They will try to attract customers and make 
them borrow for education instead of borrowing for a car or a 
house. Educational loans providers will thus clash with 
providers of car loans, mortgages, and such. 
Profit pressure is indeed the key when analyzing modern 
trends in the U.S. higher education industry and the potential 
for abuse. When the U.S. government was the sole, or the 
dominating player in the education loans business, there was 
no profit pressure on state bureaucrats and thus there might 
be little fraud. When private for-profit educational loan 
providers enter the market, their interests in combination with 
the public sector makes fraud virtually unavoidable. Ideally, 
students arc indifferent to whom they borrow from, the 
government or private loan providers, as long as the terms and 
conditions of borrowing are the same. 
Private funding of public HEls is the basis for many 
corruption-related problems. There is no profit pressure on 
HEis, but there is profit pressure on the private lenders. The 
incentive structure is such that student enrollment becomes 
the result of profit pressure while consumer protection remains 
a political activist agenda. One potential safeguard from 
predatory lending in the higher education sector would be to 
limit governmental regulations, educate consumers. and 
encourage responsible consumption. In this three-sided 
concept, each individual ought to be an educated consumer to 
make right choices regarding the quality and quantity of 
education services to consume. At the same time, each 
individual has to make rational decisions regarding borrowing 
1] LEGALITY VERSUS CORRUPTIBILITY 188 
from the state and private educational lenders in order to be a 
responsible customer of the loan industry. The rest is already 
theorized and well developed m the econom1c 1ssue of 
intertemporal choice. 120 
One can argue about the extent of the consumerist 
approach in higher education across the nations, but the trend 
toward presenting the higher education sector as a provider of 
educational services is obvious. 121 The market mechanisms 
that are being introduced on an increased scale in higher 
education do not free the industry from corruption, including 
numerous forms of misconduct. In his book on the 
commercialization of higher education, Derek Bok points out 
that: 
[t]he recent surge of commercial activity is best understood as 
only the latest in a series of steps to acquire more resources, 
beginning with the use of aggressive marketing to attract 
tuition-paying students in the early twentieth century, and 
moving on to the determined search for government and 
foundation funding after World War II, and the increasingly 
sophisticated and intensive effort over the last fifty years to 
coax gifts from well-to-do alumni and other potential 
donors. 122 
The equilibrium of supply and demand, with consumers 
voting with their dollars for the best possible choices, does not 
necessarily lead to the elimination of public sector based 
120. lntertemporal choice is the study of the relative value peopk assign to two or 
more payoffs at different points in time. Most choices require decision-makers to trade-
off costs and benefits at diffenmt points in time. These decisions maybe about savings, 
work d'fort, education, nutrition, exercise, health care and so forth. For nearly 80 
years, economists have analyzl'd intertemporal decisions using the discounted utility 
(DU) model, which assunws that people evaluate the pleasun's and pains n'sulting 
from a dr>cision in much thr> same way that financial markets evaluate losses and 
gains. exponentially 'discounting' the value of outcomes according to how delayed they 
are in time. DU has been used to describe how people actually make intl,rtemporal 
choices and it has heen used as a tool for public policy. Policy dl,cisions about how much 
to spend on research and development, health and education all depend on the discount 
rate used to analyze the decision. Gregory S. Berns, David Laibson, & George 
Loewenstein, Int!'rt!'mporal choice--toward an inte!Jrative framework, 11 TJU:NIJS IN 
C()(;NJTJVE SCIENCES 182, 182-188 (2007), available at 
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstn,am/handle/1/1551:J:l2/Laibson_lntertempont!Choicl'.pdf1 
seqtwnce=2. 
121. Tim Kaye>, Robert D. Bickc•l & Tim Birtwistle, Criticizing the Image of the 
Student as Consumer: I~xaminin!J Le!Jal Trends and Administrative Responses in the 
U.S. and U.K., 18 EDUC. AND L. 85, 85 (2006). 
122. DEREK BOK, UNJVERSITII•:S IN THE MARK~:TI'LAC~:: THE COMMERC'IALIZATION 
OF HIC:H 1-:J\ EDUCATION 10 (2001). 
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corruption. Different forms of corruption exist in the private 
sector as well. The legal definitions presented earlier explain 
why the New York State Attorney General launched his 
investigations under the auspices of consumer protection and 
fraud rather than corruption and bribery. 
The cases investigated by Attorney General Cuomo may 
necessitate development of certain measures, tools, and even 
institutions, such as the Consumer Education Fund established 
by Cuomo himself, as well as changes in legislation, designed to 
prevent doubtful practices in the futurc. 123 Provision of private 
educational loans is a growing industry in the US. It rose 
sharply from $1.57 billion in 1996 to $17 billion in 2006 and is 
expected to grow continuously and rapidly in the future. 124 
Similar developments may take place in other nations in the 
future, as commercialization of higher education proceeds. The 
process of transferring education financing to private 
educational loans represents the major trend in higher 
education funding and may soon be borrowed and adopted in 
other countries. 125 Subsequently, changes in legislation and 
regulations are necessary as are provisions in universities' 
codes of conduct not only in the U.S., but also in many other 
nations. 
Some theoretical developments arc also possible. The core 
of the problem of corruption is an intentional restriction of 
students' access to reliable information about the available 
educational loans. This situation implies imperfect 
information, imperfect competition between the educational 
12:l. /\ndrt>w Cuomo. now the N<,w York Stat.r• govt>rnor, continu<•s his rdlor·t to 
<•nham·t• consunwr· protr,ction: In the sl'ction Mt•rging and Consolidating Stat<' Agr•ncir•s 
of his proposal r·ntitiPd "2011-12 Ext>cutive lludgr't l'rovid<•s Tr:msl'ormation l'lan for a 
:'\l<·w Nl'w York." Cuomo suggt>sts that "Tiw Ext>cut.ive llud,t;et propos<'s to nwrge or· 
consolidall' 11 s<•paratp Statl' l'ntitil's into four agr,nci<•s to stn•amlinl' and l'iiminat<• 
duplicativl' bureaucracy. bdter align State rl'sponsibilitir•s with m•ed and impron• 
servicr's through SUJWrior coordination. Proposals include nwrging tlw Banking and 
lnsurancL' departments and the Consunwr Protection Board into a rww Dqmrtnwnt of' 
Financial l{egulation." Gouernor Cuomo's 2011-12 lc'xecu tiue 13udget l'nll'ides 
Trunsji;nnation !'fan jiJr a New New Yor/1, GOVERNOI(S l'ln:ss 01·'1·'1('1•:. Ft>h. 1. 2011. 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/pn•ss/020111 Lransl'ormationplan. 
121. '/'rends In Student Aid, COLLI•:<:~<: BO,\IW, 2007, http://www.collt>g<'hoard.<·om/ 
pmd downloads/about/m•ws_inf(Jitn•mls/tn•nds aid 07.pdf. See also CH,\HI.Io:NI·: W!•:.\1~ 
SII\1\10:--.JS. Ci\I.IH>I~NI;\ i{I•:SI•:AilCII illJilK\LI, STUI>I·:NT LOANS !·'Oil HH:III-:Ili•:!HiC\TIO:-.J ;;~) 
(2001-l). uuallable at http://www.libr·ary.ca.gov/crb/OK/OK-002.pdf. 
12fi. See. for instance, i\rarat Osipian, Comparing· Corruption in Hight>r l•:ducation 
in the US and thl• !{]<' (Nov. 19. 2011) (unpublished paper pn,st>nted at the Annual 
Conf('renn' o/ the Association /or the Studv o/ llighcr l~dumtlon (ASH/.;)). 
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lenders, and a certain degree of monopolization of the market 
of educational loans and eventually brings into fore antitrust 
law. 
The Cuomo cases in higher education are clearly not those 
of subprime loans and predatory lending. However, this may 
well be the case in the future, especially with a growing default 
rate on educational loans, a significant part of which are 
processed by the fast growing sector of for- profit higher 
education. The Consumer Education Fund, established by 
Attorney General Cuomo, is primarily focused on educating 
constituents on predatory lending issues. 126 There is a legacy to 
this issue as well. In 2000, then HUD Secretary Cuomo joined 
forces with Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, former 
President of Harvard University, to form the National 
Predatory Lending Task Force. 127 Investigations in 
inappropriate lending patterns in higher education are not a 
surprise but rather a natural development. The investigations 
of misdeeds in educational loans touch upon broader financial 
aid issues and then naturally develop into investigations of 
possible abuses in study abroad programs. 12X The 
investigations may eventually address all the areas where 
126. Press ]{elcase, Cuomo Announces Settlement with Student Loan Company 
Tied to NCAA Division I Schools: Lender to f:nd Kichbachs and Co-HrandinR 
Aweemcnts, STATE OF NEW YoltK OFFICE (JI<' THE AT'I'OKNEY Gi•:NEltAL, Dee. 11, 2007, 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_c,~ntt~r/2007/dec/dec11 b_07.html. See also Direct 
Mar/cetinR Code of Conduct, STATE OF NEW YOitK OFFICE OF THE ATTOitNI•:Y GI•:NEitAL. 
Dec. 2007. http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2007/dec/DeceptiveJ,oanCodeConduct-
Poster.pdf. 
127. "J{ecognizing that predatory lending was a multifaceted issue with substantial 
consequences for many consumprs, as well as for the mortgage industry, HUD 
Secn•tary Andn'w Cuomo joined forces with Treasury SL>cretary Lawrence Summers in 
April 2000 to form the National Predatory Lending Task Force. The Task Force drew 
its members from a wide range of inten,sted consumer. civil rights, and community 
groups: mortgage lending industry trade associations representing mortgage lender;;, 
brokers. and appraisers: State and local officials: and academics." Allen Fishbein & 
Harold Bunce, Subprirne Marhet Growth and Predatory LendinR, HOUSJ:--.JG POLICY IN 
THE NI•:W MILLENNIUM. available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/ 
pdf/brd/1 :lFishbein.pdf. 
128. "Months after he subpoenaed nearly a dozen private providers of overseas 
programs about their business practices and financial arrangements with colleges, 
New York State's attorney general, Andrew M. Cuomo. has expanded his investigation 
to colkgP study-abroad offices themselves ... Mr. Cuomo's office has sent subpopnas 
and doeument requests to 15 colleges, including American, Brown, Columbia, 
Fordham, Harvard, Northwestern, and Pace Universities: Manhattanville College; and 
Hobart and William Smith Colleges." Karin Fischer, Cuomo I~xpands InuestiRation of 
Study-Abroad Prowarns to Collew~s, THE CHRONICLE OF HICHE!t EDUCATION, ,Jan. 21, 
2008. http://chroniele.com/article/Cuomo-Expands-lnvestigation-of/120. 
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consumer fraud in higher education has a potential to develop 
or already takes place. 
Even if predatory lending and consumer deception do not 
fall under the corruption and bribery provisions, kickbacks do. 
Kickbacks are bribes that are promised in advance and dearly 
anticipate expectations on the side of the bribe giver. 129 At the 
same time, they are paid post factum and present certain 
guarantees to the donor. 130 As the educational loan industry 
grows, so do the opportunities for abuse. Authorities can no 
longer ignore this situation and what appears to be a long term 
trend in the education industry. 131 Higher education loans 
constitute an $85 billion per year industry, and the industry is 
growing rapidly. 132 According to the New York State 
Department of Education, two-thirds of all four-year college 
graduates nationwide now have loan debt, compared with less 
than one-third of graduates in 1998. 133 In New York State, 59%, 
of undergraduates took out loans to finance their college 
education. 134 The average student graduating from a four-year 
~~~l. "Payoff is a pay of a certain shan: or a fix<•d sum to tlw pducator in authm·ity 
who allocated funds t.o the payer of the bribe. Also S<'<: kickbacks." Ararat Osipian. 
Glossorv of 1/igher l~ducution ('orruption with Kx:planations. THI·: Ellli('.\TI<l;\1 
Rt·:c;oUiiCI·:S INI•'OIUvL\TION CJo:NTI-:Il. (ERIC). 20 (2009), auuiluhle at http://(•ric.<•(\.gov/ 
l' D I<'S/ E D:"iOfiO:-lH. pdf. 
I :m. "Kickbacks an' hrib<>S paid post ante. State funds allocated to a Ill•: I ma,· 
n•quin• a hrih<• for tlw stat<> official who mad<> tlw allocation d<·cision. Ghost t.eaclwrs 
on the payroll can pay a rwn·cntage of their salary to tlw univ<•rsit:->' administmtor who 
listPd tlwm on tlw payroll. Kickbacks an' not fix<•d at I 0 JWIT<•nt of tlw total contmct 
valm· hut vary and may n•ach to 90 percent of th<> total valuP ... /d. at I 1-l. 
1:31. l'n:ss ]{please. Attorney General Andrew Cuomo Announces First IA•gal Action 
in College Loan Industry lnuestigation. ST:\TI·: <W Nt·:W YOI(K (h'l'l('lo: <H' THI·: i\'i"I'Oii;\II·:Y 
G I•: '-I I•: HAL. Mar. :m. ~007, http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia cpntpr/~007/mar/ 
mnr~2b_07.html ("'EFI' nggTcssiv<dy of'f'en•d schools cash kickbacks in <'xch;mg<' f'or 
busim:ss. · Cuomo said. 'This kickback schenw was widesprPad and took pia<:<: from 
coast to coast. at. colleges large and small. public and private. This lawsuit is just. tlw 
bt:ginning of an investigation that will show that. lenders put market share ahovL' fair 
play. A pn•f'c:rr<:d lc:ndc:r ought to nwan that t.lw It,ndcr is prdPtn'd by stud<•nh f'or its 
low rates, not. b:-• schools fur its kickbacks. With t.hL• cost of coll<•ge rising l'V<•ry day. tfw 
last thing students want to hear is that their lc:nder may be muscling aside a mon• 
competitiv<> loan package.'"). 
1 :l2. CH:\I{LI·:NI·: WI•:;\ I( SifVIMO;\IS, CAt.ii"OHNI;\ ]{i·:c;I(\I(('H llLJI(I·:i\ll, STlllll•:'-1'1' LO.\\Ic; 
FOil Hi<:lll<:l( EllUC:\TIOi\:. 1 (200:-l). uuailahle ut ht.tp://www.lihrary.ca.gov/crb!O:-l/OK-
OO~.pdf. 
1 :l:l. l'n•ss i{<d<•ase. Attomcy General Andrew Cuomo Annou.nces First IA'.Wtl Action 
in College /,oan Industry /nucstig-ution, STAT!•: <ll-' Ni<:W YOI(K (Ji.'I•'ICI·: 01-' THI•: /\TTOI(\II•:Y 
G I·:N !<:It\ I.. :\1ar. :HJ, 2007. http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia __ cc:nt<·r·/:2007/mar/ 
mar~2h 07.ht.ml. 
1 :l1. lr/. 
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college in New York owes $17,594 on graduation day. 135 
Lastly, the results of the investigations and intentions to 
sue point to the practice of what one would define as "admitting 
without admitting," when colleges and private providers of 
educational loans de facto admit the wrongdoing or misconduct, 
but are de jure regarded as not guilty. Both the HEis and the 
providers of educational loans that are under investigation 
agree to stop their doubtful practices, sign the Code of Conduct 
offered by the Attorney General, 136 and even contribute to the 
Consumer Education Fund set by the Attorney General. 137 This 
"voluntary" contribution, made by for-profit enterprises, along 
with the refusal to admit any wrongdoing prevents the 
establishment of a true court-based legal precedent. At the 
same time, such half-victories achieved through bargaining and 
negotiations work as political dividends for Attorney General 
Cuomo, who is an elected official. In a statement regarding the 
settlement with Nelnet, Attorney General Cuomo Cuomo said 
that "by paying for exclusive referrals of their loans, Nelnet 
violated the trust that students and recent graduates place in 
their schools and alumni associations." 13X The situation 
reminds one of an aggressive campaign of the state on free 
enterprises with the demand for money, but even more so 
seeking protection of consumer rights of the state's 
constituents, including students and their parents. 139 One of 
1:15. /d. See also lJcmocratic Members of the Senate Hold a News Teleconference on 
the Release of the Student lJebt Jleport, POLITICAL TRANSCI{II'T WII\E, .June 28, 2006, 
http://www.accl~ssmylibrary.com/article-1 G l-11758:J8:i:l/democratic-memhers-senate-
bold.html. 
1 :l6. IJirect Marketing Code of Conduct, supra note 126. 
1 :n. Kdly Field, Nelnet Settles With Cuomo by Agreeing to Cease /Jeals With 
Alumni Groups, 'I'm; CHIWNICLE ()(<' HIGHER l~IJUCATJON, ,July :n, 2007, 
b t t p ://chronicle .com/ article/N e I nd-Settles-With-Cuomo-by/:l9:l1 :1. 
1 :i8. /d. 
1 :i9. "Nelnet, tbe nation's second-largest student-loan consolirlator, has agreed to 
stop paying alumni associations to recommend its consolidation loans. Undc'r the term:; 
of a sl'ttlement agn~ement with Attorney General Cuomo, Nclnet will cancel its 
'affinity' agreements with 120 alumni associations and pay $2-million into a consumer-
education fund established by Mr. Cuomo. Nelnet previously agreed to pay $1-million 
as part of a settkment with the Nebraska attorney general, but that agreement did not 
require~ the lender to end its referral arrangements ... According to Nelnet, the terms 
of the afflnity agreements varied depending on whether the alumni association was 
independent of or aff1liated with the university. Independent alumni associations 
received payments for every loan consolidation they direded to the lender above a 
certain thn~shold, while affiliated associations received an annual fee only. In return, 
the alumni associations typically promoted tbe lender on their Web sites and allowed 
Nelnut to use their college's logo for advertising purposes." ld. 
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the settlements illustrates this point: 
In recognition of the Attorney General's leadership m 
improving the circumstances under which education financing 
is made available to college students and consistent with 
Sallie Mae's commitment to educating the public about the 
financial aid process, Sallie Mae agrees to donate $2 million 
to the New York Attorney General's national fund for 
educating high school seniors and their parents regarding the 
financial aid process. 140 
Corinthian, lnc. demonstrated the similar defensive denial-
based strategy when it came to a settlement with the state. 141 
Oakland City University also denied any wrongdoing. 142 The 
offensive campaign of the state is met with the traditional 
defensiveness of HEis, in which the tradition of denial of any 
wrongdoing is certainly at least as strong as their willingness 
to revise and change current institutional policies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The processes of decentralization, marketisation, 
commercialization, commoditization, and privatization m 
high<~r education raise questions of accountability, 
transparency, quality, and access. Decentralized financing of 
higher education anticipates cost-sharing based in part on 
educational loans. The decentralized U.S. higher education 
110. l'rcss i{Pit'ase, Attorney Ocncml Cuo111o Announces Settlement with Sallie Afue 
01•cr its Student iAJCtn l'ructices. S'i'XI'/<: <H' Ni•:W Yo!lK Oi<'J<'I('J·: OF '!'HI·: i\'l'TOII:-:EY 
(; J•:NJ-:JC\L. Apr. 11. 2007, http://www.ag.ny.gov/nwdia ct•nt.t'r/2007/aprlapr11 a 07. html. 
H 1. i\ndt·t•w Calvin. Corinthian to l'uy $6.5 Million. 0Hi\N<:E C<HJNTY I~I·:<:J,.;'I'J·:H. 
1\ng. 1. 2007, http:l/artides.ocrt'gister.com/2007 -0:-\-() 1/husinpss/ 
2170:-l~l:l2_1 __ corinthian -studPnts-corinLhian-collc•gps-sl>tt h>nwnt ("( 'ori nthian 
J'<'S]l<Jlldt•d in a stai.Pment, 'W" disagn'l' with thP AttornPy (;l'lll'ral's conclusions. hut 
w<• are pll>ased to havt· this matt.pr behind us. Tlw agrP<'nwnl is not r•vidl'lll'l' of 
wrongdoing, and tlw company specitlcnlly dl'nit>d any wnmgdoing as part of tlw 
sPtllenwnt. We an• full~· committed to providing quality Pducation and job plat·r•nwnt 
snvicr•s f(Jr students and to being in compliance with stalt> law and regulation.'"). 
H~. K;Jtc• Bntsl'l', College Settles /,wi!Sliit, Oahland City Owes S:J.:J Million. 
l•:v,\NSVII ,u: COlJIU 1m & 1'1n:ss. ,July :n. ~007. http://www.courit•rpn•ss.com/m,ws/ 
2007/jul/:ll/collt•gt•-sl'ltles-lawsuit/ ("Oakbnd City Uniwrsity n•sponded 111 a 
stall•nwnt: 'Termination of t.h" lawsuit. sPttll'S a dispute concerning the propridv of <l 
compcn,;ation pl11n for admissions counsl'lors that was in dft>ct wlwn the lawsuit was 
initiatt•d and <'nable,; OCU. as wt>ll as thP other parties. to avoid tlw l'XJWns<'. lmnlr•n 
and uncertainty of litigation and administrative procel>dings. Tlw Trustl'PS wish to 
t:mphasizP that tlw sett.IPnwnt is not punitive and dot:s not implv that anv funds wen• 
missing or urwccount.ed for, nor th:tt OCU fll'l'Sl>ntly lacks or has pn·viouslv i<tckt•d 
financial n•spon,;ibility to participatl' fully in lfighpr J•:ducation Act pmgrams."'). 
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system that has long been considered an exception among other 
developed nations now turns into a sector from which 
inferences are to be drawn. This anticipates spillovers of 
problems, but not solutions. Forms of corruption that have long 
existed in the U.S. education sector, including those in quality 
assurance through accreditation, compliance with state and 
federal laws, and provision of educational loans, now have a 
potential to develop in other educational systems as well. 
The law and the legislative process in general are central 
not only to the way the U.S. system is organized, but also to the 
way it operates and resolves current problems. This fully 
applies to U.S. higher education. If an individual or an 
institution wants to resolve a certain problem, the solution may 
be found primarily within the court system. The judge is to 
decide, and the decision is to be made based on laws. The 
majority of suits are settled out of court in order to avoid high 
cost of a court trial, but the dispute is resolved between the two 
arguing parties, while state bureaucrats have no much 
involvement in the dispute resolution. National systems of 
higher education in other developed and transition countries 
can be characterized as centralized systems with states often 
playing a dominating role in most of the issues. Accordingly, 
the decisive power belongs to the executive branch, including 
the Ministry of Education and other ministries that impose 
numerous regulations and restrictions, impose sanctions, and 
resolve current problems with the help of the army of state 
bureaucrats structured in a strict hierarchical order. For 
instance, rarely one will see legal disputes between students, 
HEis, and the state in the Russian Federation being resolved 
in the court of law. When problems emerge, they are being 
routinely channeled to the bureaucratic hierarchy for the 
decision or resolution and in most of the instances do not end 
up in courts or even reach the point of some legal proceedings 
or out of court settlements. If a HEI does not comply with 
certain rules and provisions and students' or state interest are 
compromised, the institution may well be placed on probation 
or closed; and the leaders of this institution may be 
reprimanded or replaced. The so-called administrative resource 
plays a key role in decision making and dispute resolution. 
Hence, while the problems faced by the U.S. higher education 
industry and by national education industries in other 
countries may be common, the solutions may be found in 
190 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2012 
different areas. However, this situation may change if both the 
higher education systems will become more U.S.-like and the 
balance between the judiciary and executive powers of the state 
will shift more toward the judiciary branch. 
In the cases considered in this paper, the defendants did 
not admit any wrongdoing while at the same time they agreed 
to pay compensation. They did not regard such compensation 
as punitive damages and pointed to unclear legal provisions 
that regulate certain aspects of the higher education services 
provision. The government stated that colleges and financial 
institutions had committed several wrongdoings, but did not 
rely on this explicitly tough approach and also avoided court 
trials while opting for out-of-court settlements. By making this 
choice in each particular case, the government admitted ipso 
facto the existence of grey areas in the legislation. Although out 
of court settlements are encouraged due to the expense and 
time involved with going to trial, no precedent is set by the 
court ruling simply because the cases are settled out of court. 
Hence, both the government and the defendants point to the 
grey areas or not-so-clear legal provisions in the legislation. 
The application of the appropriate laws is also not very clear 
when it comes to higher education, which explains the 
existence of grey areas. This lack of clarity is explained in part 
by the unclear nature of the product of higher education. The 
pretrial out-of-court legal settlements prevent the creation of 
the legal precedent that would be set if the decision were made 
in a federal court. Applying a legal framework in research of 
corruption in higher education allows us to avoid the discussion 
of what is non-corrupt and what would be the ideal uniform 
ethical standard in the higher education industry, universally 
applied to different types of HEis and affiliated entities. But 
the issue of non-corrupt practices and what constitutes a 
higher education sector free of corruption remains and may be 
addressed in future research. 
